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Hundreds of thousands of consumer debtors pass through the bankruptcy process each year. 1 Although these cases are legally complex, the
bankruptcy system handles them in a routinized manner.2 This streamlined
process allows consumer debtors to obtain a discharge of their debts at relatively low financial cost, 3 yet the system leaves open avenues for abuse.
Repeat players can take advantage of the bankruptcy process—its complexity, the limited savvy of many debtors, and the likelihood that smallscale misbehavior will go unnoticed or unaddressed—to extract undue benefits. 4
In November 2014, for example, national news media reported allegations that large national lenders, including JPMorgan Chase, Bank of Amer1. See NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY RESEARCH CENTER, https://www.nbkrc.com (last visited
Aug. 24, 2015) (aggregating bankruptcy filing data); AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE, Bankruptcy Statistics, http://www.abi.org/newsroom/bankruptcy-statistics (last visited Aug. 24, 2015).
2. See, e.g., HENRY J. SOMMER ET AL., CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 81
(John Rao ed., 8th ed. 2006) (“Once it has been decided that bankruptcy is appropriate in a particular case, most of the remaining work is relatively routine. A good deal of it involves preparation
of the necessary papers for the initial filing . . . .”). But see Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee Study: Final Report, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 17, 121–22 (2012) (noting that,
especially after enactment of the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act, “there are ever fewer seemingly simple cases”).
3. William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397,
406 (1994) (“Routine, uncontested cases allow [consumer bankruptcy attorneys] to charge low
fees, which in turn makes it easier to attract a sufficiently large clientele to justify investment in
routinized procedures.”).
4. See generally Kara Bruce, The Debtor Class, 88 TUL. L. REV. 21, 25–42 (2013) (describing the gap between bankruptcy’s requirements and creditor action in consumer bankruptcy cases).
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ica, and Citigroup, refused to remove debt that had been discharged in
bankruptcy from borrowers’ credit reports. 5 This tactic is believed to pressure borrowers into repaying debts they no longer owe. 6 Six years earlier,
Katherine Porter brought to light pervasive problems in proofs of claim
filed by mortgage lenders and servicers.7 Her study of 1744 chapter 13
bankruptcy cases revealed rampant errors in bankruptcy mortgage claims,
most of which negatively affected debtors or competing creditors, and nearly all of which passed through the bankruptcy process unchecked. 8 In the
late 1990s, the Sears Corporation faced criminal liability and the largest fine ever assessed for bankruptcy fraud, based on a widespread program to
collect debt using unenforceable reaffirmation agreements. 9 This type of
behavior has affected thousands of debtors in bankruptcy. 10 It not only violates federal law and bankruptcy court orders, but also undermines the fundamental goals of consumer bankruptcy: treating creditors fairly and
providing debtors a fresh financial start. 11
This Article is part of the first comprehensive study examining the use
of class action adversary proceedings 12 to curb systematic overreaching by
creditors in bankruptcy. 13 Class actions have long been promoted as a solution to the problem of small value consumer claims, as they permit litigants
to bring claims that are uneconomical to litigate on an individual basis. 14
These actions not only compensate individuals for harm suffered, but also
5. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Debts Canceled by Bankruptcy Still Mar Consumer Credit
Scores, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 12, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/debts-canceled-bybankruptcy-still-mar-consumer-credit-scores/. More recently, The New York Times reported that
Bank of America has sought credit under a settlement with the Justice Department for forgiving
mortgage loans that were no longer owed because they had already been eliminated by the bankruptcy discharge. See Gretchen Morgenson, Bank of America’s Relief for Mortgage Borrowers Is
Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, (May 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/10/business/bank-ofamericas-relief-for-mortgage-borrowers-is-questioned.html?_r=0 .
6. Silver-Greenberg, supra note 5.
7. Katherine Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, 87 TEX. L.
REV. 121 (2008).
8. See id. at 144–63.
9. See Bruce, supra note 4, at 28–29 (describing the Sears Corporation’s reaffirmation practices and the criminal liability and penalties that resulted); Barnaby J. Feder, The Harder Side of
Sears, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/20/business/the-harder-sideof-sears.html (same).
10. See Bruce, supra note 4, at 25–30 (collecting examples).
11. See id. at 31–32 (discussing consumer bankruptcy’s goals); Margaret Howard, A Theory
of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047, 1047 (1987) (describing the freshstart policy of consumer bankruptcy).
12. Adversary proceedings are civil actions brought in connection with a bankruptcy case.
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001; 10-7001 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 7001.01. I refer to class action
adversary proceedings brought by debtor classes as “debtor class actions” throughout this Article.
13. The first article in this series, The Debtor Class, considered threshold jurisdictional concerns that have troubled courts and perhaps deterred debtors from pursuing aggregate claims in
bankruptcy. See Bruce, supra note 4.
14. Id. at 40 (collecting authority).
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force defendants to internalize some of the costs of their misconduct. 15 In
this way, class actions can serve as a valuable complement to bankruptcy’s
broader regulatory efforts. 16 Class actions also increase transparency, preserve judicial resources, and encourage uniformity and consistency in the
application of law. 17 Moreover, bankruptcy courts are well-suited to handle
debtor class actions, based on their institutional capacity for handling aggregate claims and addressing consumer protection’s goals.18
Nevertheless, the class action has steadily lost traction in the civil justice system. In a series of recent cases, the Supreme Court has bolstered
businesses’ ability to limit their exposure to class litigation through class
action waivers contained in consumer arbitration agreements. 19 In particular, the Supreme Court has rejected two equitable challenges to class arbitration waivers, 20 indicating that the strong federal policies underlying the
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) “trump[] any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value claims.” 21 In another series of cases, the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts have heightened the requirements of class
certification, limiting the window of cases that can be brought on a classwide basis. 22
This Article clarifies a path for debtor class actions in the modern, anti-class action framework. First, no matter how powerful class arbitration
waivers may be outside of bankruptcy, courts have broad discretion to prohibit bankruptcy claims from being resolved in arbitration if arbitration
would create an inherent conflict with bankruptcy law or necessarily jeop15. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“A class action . . .
aggregat[es] the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an
attorney’s) labor.” (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (1997)). Absent
such aggregation, “defendant firms are in a position to spread the litigation costs over the entire
class of . . . claims, while plaintiffs . . . can not . . . .” David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass
Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 564 (1987); see also In re
Am. Reserve Corp., 840 F.2d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he class action provides compensation
that cannot be achieved in any other way; although the costs of litigation may consume much of
the benefit, the device still serves a deterrent function by ensuring that wrongdoers bear the costs
of their activities.”).
16. See Bruce, supra note 4, at 40 (discussing the regulatory benefits of private litigation).
For a brief discussion and response to predominant critiques of class actions, see id. at 40–42.
17. See id.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 47–50.
19. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309–10 (2013) (rejecting
“effective vindication of statutory rights” challenge to class arbitration waivers); AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding unconscionability challenge to class arbitration waiver was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 687 (2010) (holding arbitration clause that was silent on the
issue of class arbitration could not be construed to permit class arbitration).
20. I use the term “class arbitration waivers” to describe any waivers of class action rights
that appear in an arbitration agreement.
21. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2312 n.5.
22. See infra Part IV.
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ardize the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code. 23 As a descriptive matter, arbitration of many debtor class action proceedings will likely present an inherent conflict with the Bankruptcy Code. 24 As a normative matter, courts
should consider class-killing arbitration clauses as probative evidence of an
inherent conflict whenever the clause would preclude debtor classes from
effectively vindicating their bankruptcy rights. 25 Second, although the requirements for class certification are rigorous, some of the most troubling
debtor class action cases are prime candidates for certification.26
To be sure, the window of debtor class action cases that can survive
these modern challenges is narrow. Nevertheless, in light of the regulatory
benefits of class actions, debtors’ attorneys, case trustees, and courts should
embrace debtor classes to the extent permissible under applicable law. In
addition, scholars and lawmakers should consider ways to encourage greater levels of compliance with applicable bankruptcy law and procedure,
whether by reviving aspects of the class device or advancing non-class
methods of private litigation. 27
Part II begins by describing debtor class actions and the challenges
they face. It then focuses on the rise of class action waivers in consumer
arbitration agreements, the Supreme Court’s embrace of these waivers, and
the impact this case law has on small value claims. 28 Part III places these
developments in the context of a debtor class action proceeding, arguing
that courts can, through application of the “inherent conflict” test, preserve
debtor class actions in the face of a class arbitration waiver. 29 In Part IV,
this Article argues that modern class certification standards do not completely foreclose debtor class action relief. 30 This Article concludes by observing that class actions can serve as a valuable component of consumer
bankruptcy’s regulatory structure, and looks forward to additional reforms
to encourage compliance with consumer bankruptcy law. 31

23. See infra Part III.B.
24. See infra Part III.C.
25. See infra Part III.D.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. A subsequent article discusses additional options to address lender noncompliance in
bankruptcy. See Kara Bruce, Closing Consumer Bankruptcy’s Enforcement Gap, forthcoming
(2016).
28. See infra Part II.
29. See infra Part III.A–D.
30. See infra Part IV.
31. See infra Part V.
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I. DEBTOR CLASS ACTIONS AND THE CHALLENGES THEY FACE
A. Debtor Class Actions
This series of articles seeks to address a rift between the norms of
bankruptcy law and the realities of bankruptcy practice. As noted above,
large institutional lenders—some with thousands of borrowers in bankruptcy—may routinely fail to comply with consumer bankruptcy law and procedure. 32 The alarming prevalence of this behavior came to the fore in the
wake of the Great Recession, along with the “robo-signing” scandal that
exposed similar misconduct in mortgage foreclosure cases.33 Yet high profile examples preceding and following the foreclosure crisis indicate that
this problem is not limited to mortgage lenders and servicers and likewise
has not been resolved. 34
Some cases of lender noncompliance in bankruptcy arise from understaffing, institutional sloppiness, or the use of bookkeeping software that is
not designed to accommodate the bankruptcy process. 35 Others suggest a
more calculated departure from the requirements of bankruptcy law and
procedure. 36 Whatever their origin, the actions or inactions of creditors in
bankruptcy can disadvantage competing claimants to the debtor’s limited
pool of assets, or may jeopardize the debtor’s pursuit of a fresh start.37
Moreover, although some of these issues have been highly publicized and
have resulted in enforcement 38 and law reform 39 efforts, lender noncompliance persists. 40

32. See supra notes 5–9 and accompanying text; Bruce, supra note 4, at 25–30 (collecting
additional examples).
33. See Bruce, supra note 4, at 25–28 (describing pervasive under-compliance with bankruptcy and foreclosure law by mortgage lenders and servicers).
34. See supra note 5 (highlighting recent examples); Bruce, supra note 4, at 28–30 (highlighting examples not related to the Great Recession).
35. See, e.g., Bruce, supra note 4, at 28; Alan M. White, Losing the Paper—Mortgage Assignments, Note Transfers and Consumer Protection, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 468, 469–70
(2012) (describing mortgage lenders’ documentation shortcuts, such as “assembly-line signing and
notarizing of affidavits for foreclosure cases, mortgage assignments, note allonges and related
documents” known generally as “robo-signing”).
36. See, e.g., In re Stewart, 391 B.R. 327, 355–57 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2008) (sanctioning mortgage servicer for inflating proofs of claim with fees for excessive drive-by property inspections,
inspections on property other than the debtor’s, and two broker price opinions that were allegedly
conducted when the property was inaccessible to civilians in the wake of Hurricane Katrina).
37. See Bruce, supra note 4, at 34.
38. See id. at 35 (discussing efforts by the U.S. Trustee Program, federal and state agencies,
and individual bankruptcy judges to address such abuse).
39. See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001 (amending the proof-of-claim filing rules to require,
among other things, an itemization of interest, fees, expenses, and other charges claimed, as well
as the amount necessary to cure a default and, if the lien is on the debtor’s principal residence,
provide an escrow statement as of the petition date); id. at 3002.1 (requiring holders of mortgage
claims to provide notice before a change in the amount of mortgage payments, as well as notices
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In the first article in this series, The Debtor Class, I explored the use of
class action adversary proceedings as a complement to bankruptcy’s regulatory structure and an added check on lender conduct. 41 As other scholars
have observed, the evidence of sloppiness and overreaching in the bankruptcy arena suggests that large consumer lenders may lack sufficient incentives to comply with bankruptcy law and procedure in consumer bankruptcy
cases. 42 Consumer bankruptcy features numerous layers of protection from
abuse—including the presence of a case trustee, the oversight of a United
States Trustee Program, and the bankruptcy courts’ statutory and inherent
powers to address wrongdoing 43—but each of these entities is poorly positioned to discover small but pervasive incidences of lender misconduct. 44
Moreover, even if a debtor or her attorney discovers the abuse, it might not
be economically feasible to challenge the practices.45 A robust threat of
class actions may provide a deterrent stopgap at a lower institutional cost,
fill in the gaps that remain from existing enforcement efforts, and deter future wrongful conduct. 46
In many ways, bankruptcy is an ideal forum for consumer class actions
to flourish. First, the bankruptcy system has a long history of furthering the
goals of consumer financial protection. William Whitford has argued that
of the fees, expenses, or charges incurred post-petition that the claimant asserts are recoverable
from the debtor).
40. To date, the national mortgage settlement is the most significant enforcement effort of
bankruptcy misconduct. See About the Settlement, JOINT STATE-FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
SETTLEMENTS, http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/about (last visited Aug. 24, 2015).
Yet it has become increasingly clear that violations of bankruptcy law remain, and the mortgage
lenders and servicers subject to the settlement have not followed it to the letter. See Danielle
Douglas, Some Big Banks Are Still Violating the National Mortgage Settlement, Report Says,
WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/some-big-banksare-still-violating-the-national-mortgage-settlement-report-says/2013/12/04/02b4091a-5d1b-11e395c2-13623eb2b0e1_story.html; Bruce, supra note 4, at 35 (cataloguing early evidence of noncompliance with new Bankruptcy Rules). Moreover, reports of lenders’ failure to clean credit reports and other foreclosure practices suggest that these problems will continue. See SilverGreenberg, supra note 5; Gretchen Morgenson, Borrowers, Beware: The Robo-Signers Aren’t
Finished Yet, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 15, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1uwZU34.
41. Bruce, supra note 4, at 34–42.
42. See id. at 23; see also Porter, supra note 7, at 171 (“[T]he current system suggests that
creditors can operate with the knowledge that their claims will not be reviewed or challenged.”).
43. Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1194 (2014) (discussing bankruptcy courts’ statutory and
inherent powers).
44. See Bruce, supra note 4, at 37 (highlighting the limitations of many current methods to
combat lender misconduct); Anne E. Wells, Not in My House: Combating Unethical Mortgage
Lender Practices and Related Attorney Misconduct in the Bankruptcy Courts, 32 CAL. BANKR. J.
483, 509 (2013) (same).
45. See Bruce, supra note 4, at 37; see also In re Henry, 311 B.R. 813, 816 (Bankr. W.D.
Wash. 2004) (“[B]ecause the cost of pursuing an objection frequently exceeds the distribution the
claim will receive under the plan, [debtors] are forced by the economics of the process just to pay
the claim even if they have valid defenses to it.”).
46. Bruce, supra note 4, at 24. Class actions, of course, are not without their limitations. My
previous article addresses some of the predominant criticisms of the class action. See id. at 41–42.
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consumer bankruptcy has accomplished more than other reforms—small
claims courts and low-cost legal assistance, for example—to help consumers obtain relief with respect to disputed debts. 47 Indeed, because of bankruptcy’s relative affordability and effectiveness, Whitford dubbed consumer
bankruptcy “a primary vehicle for delivering the elusive goal of consumer
justice.” 48 Relatedly, bankruptcy’s layers of oversight, while insufficient to
target all bankruptcy abuse, have been fairly effective at catching egregious
lender misconduct. For example, the United States Trustee Program’s investigation of bankruptcy misconduct played a central role in bringing to
light the abuses of mortgage lenders and servicers during the worst of the
foreclosure crisis. 49 Second, in addition to consumer bankruptcy’s role in
furthering consumer protection, bankruptcy courts have the procedural capacity to handle aggregate actions. Troy McKenzie recently referred to
bankruptcy law as “the oldest, most enduring, and most far-reaching form
of procedural aggregation in use in the United States.”50
Although debtor classes have attempted to challenge lender misconduct at various points in the last thirty years,51 the debtor class action remains a relatively obscure phenomenon. The following sections detail two
primary hurdles that class action adversary proceedings have faced: bank47. Whitford, supra note 3, at 398.
48. Id. at 401.
49. See Clifford J. White III & Ramona D. Elliott, $25 Billion Mortgage Servicer Settlement—Implications for the United States Trustee Program and the Bankruptcy System,
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ust/legacy/2012/04/30/abi_201203.pdf (describing the
role of the U.S. Trustee Program in achieving a $25 billion dollar settlement with major mortgage
lenders and servicers).
50. Troy A. McKenzie, Bankruptcy and the Future of Aggregate Litigation: The Past as Prologue?, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 839, 842 (2013).
51. Retail lenders were an early target of debtor class action cases, once evidence came to
light that many retailers were disregarding bankruptcy law governing the reaffirmation of debt in
consumer bankruptcy cases. See Bruce, supra note 4, at 29 (describing this scandal); Conley v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 222 B.R. 181, 182 (D. Mass. 1998) (describing Sears’ reaffirmation practices); Feder, supra note 9 (noting that “May Department Stores and Montgomery Ward have . . .
been hit with class action lawsuits over their reaffirmation practices”); In re Singleton, 284 B.R.
322, 323–24 (D.R.I. 2002) (outlining plaintiffs’ claims against Wells Fargo based on the collection under an invalid reaffirmation agreement); Bessette v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 279 B.R. 442,
445 (D.R.I. 2002) (same with respect to Avco Financial Services); In re Aiello, 231 B.R. 693, 699
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999) (noting that debtor alleged that lender had a practice of sending intimidating communications to debtors to coerce them to sign reaffirmation agreements in violation of the
automatic stay), aff’d sub nom. Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 257 B.R. 245 (N.D. Ill. 2000),
aff’d, 239 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2001). More recently, widespread noncompliance by mortgage lenders and servicers has resulted in a number of new class action proceedings in the bankruptcy arena. See, e.g., In re Brannan, 485 B.R. 443, 448 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2013) (alleging robo-signing
violations); In re Rojas, No. 07–70058, 2009 WL 2496807 at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2009)
(alleging mortgage lenders filed false proofs of claim); In re Rodriguez, 396 B.R. 436, 439
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008) (alleging mortgage lenders failed to properly apply plan payment and
assessed post-petition charges in violation of bankruptcy rules); In re Cano, 410 B.R. 506, 518
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (same); In re Alcantara, 389 B.R. 270, 273 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008) (alleging lender sent misleading mortgage statements in violation of the automatic stay).
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ruptcy courts’ subject matter jurisdiction of a class of debtors and motions
to compel arbitration of the proceedings. 52
B. Jurisdictional Challenges to Debtor Class Actions
The very concept of a debtor class action may seem, at first blush, to
be fundamentally at odds with bankruptcy’s debtor-focused jurisdictional
scheme. 53 Indeed, many courts have balked at asserting jurisdiction over a
nationwide class of debtors, based on bankruptcy’s policy of centralizing all
claims of or against a single debtor in bankruptcy court.54 In The Debtor
Class, I explain how many such initial reactions to debtor class actions are
misplaced. 55 While a strong policy of centralization indeed forms the heart
of bankruptcy jurisdiction, adversary proceedings are treated with a greater
amount of flexibility. In contrast to federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction
over bankruptcy cases and property of the estate,56 jurisdiction over proceedings that arise in bankruptcy is nonexclusive 57 and subject to transfer to
state or federal courts in a variety of circumstances.58
Courts that have rejected debtor class actions based on jurisdictional
concerns fall largely into three categories. The first category reads into
bankruptcy’s jurisdictional framework a requirement that an adversary proceeding bear some relationship or “nexus” to the representative debtor’s
case. 59 The second category focuses on bankruptcy courts’ exclusive juris-

52. A third challenge, related to the second, is the difficulty of certifying a debtor class. Part
IV discusses this issue.
53. See Bruce, supra note 4, at 43.
54. Id.
55. See Bruce, supra note 4, at 50–67.
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (e) (2012).
57. Id. at § 1334(b).
58. See Richard H. Gibson, Home Court, Outpost Court: Reconciling Bankruptcy Case Control with Venue Flexibility in Proceedings, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 37, 38 (1988) (“[Bankruptcy] proceedings are discrete pieces of litigation which can involve parties, issues and fact patterns having
little to do with the other aspects of the case and little connection with the home court. Recognizing this, Congress provided that venue over proceedings always is transferable to ‘outpost
courts.’” (footnotes omitted)); see also Bruce, supra note 4, at 59–60 (discussing bankruptcy’s
abstention and venue rules, which define circumstances in which matters may, or must, be heard
in other courts).
59. See Knox v. Sunstar Acceptance Corp. (In re Knox), 237 B.R. 687, 693 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1999) (“[C]lass claims for monetary recovery could only benefit the class members, but could not
affect the amount of property available for distribution in Knox’s case and thus could not affect
allocation of property among Knox’s creditors.”); Lenior v. GE Capital Corp. (In re Lenior), 231
B.R. 662, 668 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999) (“This Court is not a forum for recovery of money that
would not be part of the bankruptcy estate or of this Debtor.”); Simmons v. Ford Motor Credit Co.
(In re Simmons), 237 B.R. 672, 676 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999) (“The only case before this court is
debtor’s chapter 13 proceeding. The class claims will not affect the amount of property available
for distribution in debtor’s case, nor will they affect the allocation of property among debtor’s
creditors. As a result, ‘related to’ jurisdiction does not support jurisdiction over the class claims
alleged herein.”); Wiley v. Mason (In re Wiley), 224 B.R. 58, 64 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998) (same);
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diction over property of the debtor’s estate,60 finding this language requires
the “home court” to handle any proceedings that arise in the debtor’s case. 61
The third category concerns cases in which the court must exercise its contempt power, typically to punish violations of the automatic stay or discharge injunction. 62 Under those circumstances, some courts conclude that
the dispute at issue must be resolved by the court that issued the relevant
injunction. 63
The Debtor Class considers and rejects each of these challenges to
class action adversary proceedings. It concludes that the first category
misanalyses relevant law. 64 While the second and third categories of cases
reach more plausible conclusions under the bankruptcy jurisdictional statutes, either the analysis is problematic, or it is equally or more compelling
to interpret bankruptcy’s jurisdictional provision to permit jurisdiction over
a nationwide debtor class. 65 In sum, The Debtor Class finds few meaning-

see also Cline v. First Nationwide Mortg. Corp. (In re Cline), 282 B.R. 686, 692–94 (W.D. Wash.
2002) (invoking aspects of the early “nexus” cases).
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e).
61. See, e.g., Williams v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (In re Williams), 244 B.R. 858, 866 (S.D.
Ga. 2000) (“If the claims raised by Plaintiff on behalf of the putative members of the debtor class
are ‘property’ of each individual debtor’s bankruptcy estate, § 1334(e) prohibits this Court—or
any court other than ‘[t]he district court in which [the] case under title 11 is commenced or pending’ for that matter—from exercising jurisdiction over that property.” (alterations in original)),
aff’d, 34 F. App’x 967 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Guetling v. Household Fin. Servs., Inc., 312 B.R.
699, 704 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (same); In re Cline, 282 B.R. at 695–96 (same).
62. For a description of these cases, see Bruce, supra note 4, at 62–64.
63. See, e.g., In re Death Row Records, Inc., No. 06-11205, 2012 WL 952292, at *12 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. Mar. 21, 2012) (finding that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over a nationwide class
for claims other than claims punishable by contempt); Montano v. First Light Fed. Credit Union
(In re Montano), Nos. 7-04-17866 SL, 7-1026 S, 2007 WL 2688606, at *2 (Bankr. D.N.M. Sept.
10, 2007) (“As a general rule, only the court that issues the disobeyed order or injunction has jurisdiction to hold a violator in contempt.”); Guetling, 312 B.R. at 704 (“To the extent those alleged out-of-district class members have claims arising from their bankruptcy proceedings in other
districts, those districts are the proper locations to bring those claims or to potentially pursue actions for contempt of any court orders.”); Barrett v. Avco Fin. Servs. Mgmt. Co., 292 B.R. 1, 8 (D.
Mass. 2003) (“The court believes that it lacks jurisdiction over the claims of putative class members whose bankruptcies were discharged outside the District of Massachusetts.”); Singleton v.
Wells Fargo Bank (In re Singleton), 284 B.R. 322, 325 (D.R.I. 2002) (“Subject matter jurisdiction
in this case is determined by the . . . legal principle that only persons subject to a court’s authority
may be found in contempt by that court.”); Bessette v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 279 B.R. 442, 449
(D.R.I. 2002) (“[T]he Court only has jurisdiction over claims that are related to bankruptcy estates
in the District of Rhode Island.”); In re Williams, 244 B.R. at 867 (“The Court . . . has no jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief for members of the putative class unless the specific discharge injunction . . . was entered by the Southern District of Georgia.”); Nelson v. Providian Nat’l Bank
(In re Nelson), 234 B.R. 528, 534 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999) (“[T]he bankruptcy court has no jurisdiction to entertain a private cause of action for damages by debtors who obtained their discharge
in a court other than this one.”).
64. Bruce, supra note 4, at 51–56.
65. Id. at 57–72. This is not to say that a nationwide class always is desirable. Class counsel
may find that smaller classes might be easier to manage or bring other strategic advantages.
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ful jurisdictional limitations on debtor class action adversary proceedings in
bankruptcy.
C. Arbitration Agreements as a Shield to Class Action Liability
The typical debtor class action adversary proceeding features a class of
debtors seeking relief against a common creditor. If the underlying debtorcreditor relationship is governed by an agreement containing an arbitration
clause, a creditor might seek to compel arbitration of the proceeding. 66
Creditors may seek arbitration because they believe that the arbitral forum
will be more convenient or produce a more favorable result.67 As discussed
in this Part, however, creditors may instead rely on arbitration clauses as a
tool to avoid class action liability.
1. The Liberal Federal Policy in Favor of Arbitration
Over the last thirty years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly underscored that the FAA creates a “liberal federal policy” in favor of arbitration. 68 Although the FAA originally governed negotiated agreements between sophisticated business parties,69 over time, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the FAA to hold that it applies to consumer adhesion contracts
and employment agreements, that it affects statutory rights, that it applies in
state courts, and that it preempts conflicting state laws. 70 Buoyed by the
66. See, e.g., Belton v. GE Capital Consumer Lending, Inc. (In re Belton), No. 12-23037
(RDD), 2014 WL 5819586 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2014) (motion to compel arbitration of
class action proceeding); Rivers v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC (In re Rivers), No. 03-05671-NPO,
2010 WL 5375950, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Dec. 22, 2010) (same); Cavanaugh v. Conseco Fin.
Servicing Corp. (In re Cavanaugh), 271 B.R. 414, 415–16 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) (same); Knepp
v. Credit Acceptance Corp. (In re Knepp), 229 B.R. 821, 827 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999) (same).
67. See, e.g., Arentson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. (In re Arentson), 126 B.R. 236, 238
(Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1991) (“It is extremely doubtful that the plaintiff, a Chapter 7 bankrupt, has
the financial means to fairly compete with the defendant in an arbitration format. Indeed, the
Court suspects that this is one of the predominant reasons that the defendant would like to see this
matter submitted to arbitration.”).
68. See, e.g., CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012) (noting that the
FAA “establishes ‘a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements’” (quoting Moses H.
Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983))); AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (same); EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279,
289 (2002) (same); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
475 (1989) (same); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625
(1985) (same); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24 (same). For an extensive discussion
of the development of the FAA, as well as early Supreme Court construction of the FAA, see
Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99 (2006).
69. See, e.g., Moses, supra note 68, at 111–12 (“The FAA was a bill of limited scope, intended to apply in disputes between merchants of approximately equal economic strength to questions
arising out of their daily relations.”).
70. See id. at 114–55 (describing the Supreme Court’s gradual expansion of arbitration policy
through 2006). A rough chronology of this expansion includes the following cases: Moses H.
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Supreme Court’s strong support of arbitration agreements, contracting parties have embraced arbitration agreements in a variety of previously unimaginable contexts, including consumer contracts of adhesion. 71 Many such
clauses attempt to adjust a broad range of contractual or statutory rights,
such as statutes of limitation, discovery procedures, forum selection, and
available remedies.72 Courts have approved these types of terms even in
consumer contracts, despite the fact that such agreements are typically imposed on the party with the weaker bargaining position and might contain
provisions strongly favoring the drafter. 73

Cone Memorial Hospital, 460 U.S. at 24 (holding the FAA governs in both state or federal court);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (holding the FAA preempts state law);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 6338 (holding the FAA applies not only to contract matters,
but also to statutory claims involving antitrust law); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (holding securities fraud claims under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 are arbitrable); Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686–87 (1996)
(holding arbitration agreements may be revoked only by generally applicable contract defenses
and not by state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,
532 U.S. 105, 114–15 (2001) (expanding the FAA to apply to most employment agreements, despite language in the FAA that it should not “apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce”); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 349–50 (2008) (holding the FAA preempts state laws requiring
certain disputes to be resolved by state administrative agencies); Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds
International Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010) (holding that contracts silent on the issue of
class arbitration cannot be read to permit class arbitration); Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (2011)
(invalidating California laws that prohibited class litigation and arbitration waivers); and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013) (holding that a contractual waiver of class arbitration is enforceable even if arbitration is economically infeasible as a
result).
71. See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1631, 1639 (2005) (collecting examples). Arbitration clauses now appear in shrinkwrap licenses
and mail inserts, product websites, cell phone contracts, checking account agreements, and at least
once on the doorstep of a restaurant. Id.; Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The
Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L.
REV. 457, 464 (2011) (collecting examples); J. Maria Glover, Beyond Unconscionability: Class
Action Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1736–37 (2006)
(same); see also Stephanie Strom, When “Liking” a Brand Online Voids the Right to Sue, N.Y.
TIMES, (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/17/business/when-liking-a-brandonline-voids-the-right-to-sue.html (discussing newer initiatives to include binding arbitration
clauses on store websites and social media). For an example of a doorway arbitration clause, see
Stephanie Mencimer, Eat Burger, Waive Right to Sue, MOTHER JONES, (Jan. 31, 2008),
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2008/01/eat-burger-waive-right-sue.
72. Glover, supra note 71, at 1742; see also Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1005 (1996)
(“[P]arties are largely free to specify by contract the procedures governing their arbitration. The
Court has even suggested that they may be free to specify by contract the remedies the arbitrator
may award, specifically, whether punitive damages are available in arbitration.”).
73. Glover, supra note 71, at 1743; see also CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU,
ARBITRATION STUDY PRELIMINARY RESULTS 6 (2013) [hereinafter “CFPB STUDY”] (“[C]ourts
regularly enforce pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer, employment, and other contexts in
which the relevant contract is not subject to negotiation between the contracting parties.”).
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2. Class Arbitration Waivers
Since the late 1990s, consumer arbitration clauses have increasingly
contained waivers of the right to aggregate claims into a class action proceeding. 74 Such waivers can be very expansive, foreclosing any aggregation of claims, whether inside or outside the arbitral forum. 75 Some scholars believe the avoidance of aggregate proceedings is a primary reason
companies include arbitration provisions in consumer financial contracts. 76
Professors Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller, and Emily Sherwin
studied a sample of twenty-six consumer and 164 nonconsumer contracts
used by large public corporations, finding that “large companies [in the
study’s sample] overwhelmingly selected arbitration as the method for resolving consumer disputes [but] permitted litigation as the method for resolving business disputes.” 77 Indeed, seventy-five percent of the consumer
contracts in the study’s sample contained arbitration provisions, while arbitration provisions appeared in only around six percent of negotiated business contracts. 78 Moreover, class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts
seemed essential to the existence of these arbitration agreements. 79 Of the
consumer contracts with arbitration clauses, one hundred percent prohibited
class arbitration, and eighty percent contained a waiver of other class litigation rights. 80 Sixty percent of these waivers contained non-severability

74. Trade journal articles published around this time encouraged corporate counsel to include
waivers of collective action in form contracts and often recommended that these waivers be drafted as part of an arbitration clause to take advantage of the strong judicial support of FAA. For a
thorough discussion of this development of collective action waivers, see Myriam Gilles, Opting
Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 373, 396–99 (2005). For recent data on the incidence of these clauses in consumer contracts, see CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO
CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT § 1028(A) 2:6-27 (2015) [hereinafter “CFPB FINAL REPORT”].
75. See, e.g., CFPB STUDY, supra note 73, at 13 (noting that the terms of arbitration clauses
studied “effectively preclude all class proceedings, in court or in arbitration”).
76. See, e.g., Glover, supra note 71, at 1736–37 (“Corporations . . . have increasingly sought
to channel [consumer] claims to arbitration, while at the same time denying claimants the right to
proceed through class actions.”); Amy J. Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical
Data in Crafting Arbitration Reforms, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 150 (2010) (concluding
“companies use arbitration clauses to limit their vulnerability to consumer claims, especially class
actions”).
77. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 871, 881, 883
(2008).
78. Id. at 882–83.
79. Id. at 883.
80. Id. at 884. These findings align with the CFPB’s study on consumer arbitration clauses.
CFPB STUDY, supra note 73, at 37 (“Almost all of the arbitration clauses studied contained terms
limiting class proceedings.”); CFPB FINAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 2:45 (“[C]lass arbitration
was unavailable for 99.9% of arbitration-subject credit card loans outstanding, 97.1% of arbitration-subject insured deposits, essentially 100.0% of arbitration-subject prepaid card loads, 98.2%
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clauses, which voided the arbitration clause if class procedures were allowed. 81 Based on these findings, the authors observed that “[t]he growth
of mandatory consumer arbitration clauses appears to be part of a broader
initiative by corporations to preclude or limit aggregate litigation.”82 This
conclusion finds further support in the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s recent study of consumer arbitration clauses, which found that corporations rarely seek to enforce arbitration agreements in individual suits, but
commonly move to compel arbitration to block a class action.83
3. The Supreme Court’s Rejection of Equitable Challenges to Class
Arbitration Waivers
The proliferation of arbitration agreements in consumer contracts has
drawn the attention of many scholars and commentators, who hotly debate
the impact of a strong pro-arbitration policy on the vindication of consumer
rights. 84 Critics of consumer arbitration agreements highlight, in particular,
the impact of class arbitration waivers on negative-value consumer
claims. 85 The class action process has historically been used as a means for
individuals to pursue claims that are too small to litigate on an individual
basis. 86 If the right to aggregate claims in a class-wide procedure is unavailable, small-value claimants may not have the resources to challenge
wrongful conduct. 87 As Judge Posner memorably quipped, “[t]he realistic
alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero indi-

of arbitration-subject payday loan storefronts, and 99.7% of arbitration-subject mobile wireless
subscribers”).
81. Eisenberg et al., supra note 77, at 884.
82. Id. at 895.
83. See Richard Cordray, Prepared Remarks of CFPB Director Richard Cordray at the Arbitration Field Hearing, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/prepared-remarks-of-cfpbdirector-richard-cordray-at-the-arbitration-field-hearing/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2015) (summarizing the CFPB FINAL REPORT).
84. Compare, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in
Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 766 (2002) (“‘[M]andatory’ arbitration—arbitration
imposed by pre-dispute clauses in contracts of adhesion which, as a practical matter, the nondrafting parties have no real power to avoid or disapprove—will, if allowed to continue unchecked, largely deprive American courts of the ability to play the important social role they
played so effectively throughout the last century.”), with Cole, supra note 71, at 469
(“[N]umerous empirical studies of arbitration demonstrate that consumer arbitration agreements
typically provide consumers with fair and affordable access to justice.”).
85. See Glover, supra note 71, at 1737 (“[W]here the expected recovery does not justify the
cost of a stand-alone claim . . . corporations have the greatest incentive to write class action waivers into mandatory arbitration provisions.”).
86. See Bruce, supra note 4, at 40.
87. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 165, 184–85 (2003)
(“Forestalling class litigation in many instances is tantamount to eliminating disputes altogether.”).
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vidual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.” 88 Thus, class arbitration waivers could provide businesses the opportunity to violate consumers’ rights with impunity. 89 Critics also argue that arbitration may eliminate
the procedural protections of a judicial forum, decrease transparency, and
obscure the development of precedent.90
Some consumers have attempted to challenge the enforceability of
class arbitration waivers based upon the barriers to litigation that they create. Two primary theories have emerged: first, that these provisions are unconscionable under applicable state law; and second, that they preclude the
“effective vindication of statutory rights.” 91 While these challenges met
with some success in the lower courts, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 92 and American Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant 93 sharply limit their continued vitality.
a. Unconscionability Challenges and AT&T v. Concepcion
The FAA provides that arbitration agreements are enforceable, except
to the extent that “grounds . . . exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.” 94 The Supreme Court acknowledged in Doctor’s Associates,
Inc. v. Casarotto that common law unconscionability doctrines could provide a defense to an arbitration agreement’s enforceability. 95 After that
case, some courts began to “blow[] the dust off their largely dormant unconscionability jurisprudence [to] invalidate[] class action waivers.”96
In Discover Bank v. Superior Court, for example, the California Supreme Court applied California’s unconscionability doctrine 97 to class action waivers in consumer contracts of adhesion, holding that “to the extent
[such waivers] operate to insulate a party from liability that otherwise
would be imposed under California law,” they are unenforceable.98 The
88. Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
89. Cf. Colin P. Marks, The Irony of AT&T v. Concepcion, 87 IND. L.J. SUPP. 31, 32 (2012)
(“If [Concepcion] is read broadly, . . . every corporation will be inserting class action waivers into
their arbitration clauses (if they have not already), and may be emboldened to go much further.”).
90. See CFPB STUDY, supra note 73, at 7–8 (summarizing criticism).
91. See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 632–37 (2012).
92. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
93. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
94. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
95. 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
96. Gilles & Friedman, supra note 91, at 632.
97. 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). California permits a court to refuse to enforce a contract it
finds “to have been unconscionable at the time it was made” and further to “limit the application
of any unconscionable clause.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1670.5(a) (West 2014).
98. See Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 162–63 (Cal. 2005) (holding “when [a class action]
waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the par-
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court’s ruling underscored that the class action device is a vital mechanism
to vindicate small claims and ensure compliance with the law.99 Following
the California Supreme Court’s lead, a number of courts around the country
similarly invalidated class action waivers on unconscionability grounds. 100
The Supreme Court took a decisive stance against California’s unconscionability doctrine in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. 101 Concepcion
involved claims for false advertising and fraud based on AT&T’s alleged
practice of advertising a cell phone as “free” with a two-year contract. 102
When AT&T moved to compel individual arbitration of the dispute, the
plaintiffs argued that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable under
California law because it disallowed class-wide procedures. 103 The district
court held that the class action waiver was invalid under Discover Bank,
and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 104
In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment, holding that Discover Bank “stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress” and is thus preempted by the FAA. 105 The Court drew a sharp
distinction between bilateral arbitration and arbitration on a class-wide basis, finding the latter ill-suited to the arbitral forum:
Class-wide arbitration includes absent parties, necessitating additional and different procedures and involving higher stakes.
Confidentiality becomes more difficult. And while it is theoretically possible to select an arbitrator with some expertise relevant
to the class-certification question, arbitrators are not generally
knowledgeable in the often-dominant procedural aspects of certification, such as the protection of absent parties. 106
ty with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers
of consumers out of individually small sums of money, then . . . such waivers are unconscionable
under California law”).
99. Id. at 156–58.
100. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011) (collecting cases).
101. Id. at 1746–48.
102. Id. at 1744. Vincent and Liza Concepcion argued, on behalf of similarly situated plaintiffs, this advertisement disguised the reality that a sales tax of $30.22 (in the Concepcion’s case)
would be assessed. Id.
103. Id. at 1745.
104. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05CV1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at *14
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir.
2009), rev’d sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) and amended
in part, No. 05CV1167 DMS WVG, 2012 WL 1681762 (S.D. Cal. May 9, 2012).
105. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
106. Id. at 1750. This language closely tracks the Court’s reasoning in Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., in which the Court held that an arbitration agreement that was silent on the
issue of class arbitration could not be construed to permit arbitration on a class-wide basis. 130 S.
Ct. 1758, 1764 (2010). In so holding, the court underscored the “fundamental changes” wrought
by class arbitration on the traditional arbitration process, concluding that “the differences between

2016]

VINDICATING BANKRUPTCY RIGHTS

459

Accordingly, the Court found that doctrines that require the availability of class-wide arbitration would “interfere[] with fundamental attributes
of arbitration and . . . create[] a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”107
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan, argued that the principles advanced in Discover
Bank align with both the language and the purpose of the FAA.108 The dissent challenged the majority’s support of bilateral arbitration to the exclusion of class arbitration, noting that “neither the history nor present practice
suggests class arbitration is fundamentally incompatible with arbitration itself.” 109 The dissent then highlighted the function of the Discover Bank
rule in preventing the manipulation of consumer contracts to insulate corporate actors from fraud and argued the state’s decision should be respected. 110
b. “Effective Vindication” Challenges and American Express
Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant
Other plaintiffs have attempted to challenge class arbitration waivers
using what has been termed an “effective vindication of statutory rights”
theory. 111 In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the
Supreme Court held that the FAA permitted arbitration of federal statutory
claims, but imposed a limitation: Such claims were arbitrable “so long as
the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.” 112 In a subsequent case, the Court acknowledged that if the costs of arbitration were excessive, such costs might be
sufficient to “preclude a litigant . . . from effectively vindicating her federal
statutory rights.” 113 Some plaintiffs have used this line of reasoning to
mount an attack on class arbitration waivers, arguing that the cost of bring-

bilateral and class action arbitration are too great for arbitrators to presume . . . that the parties’
mere silence on the issue of class-action arbitration constitutes consent to resolve their disputes in
class proceedings.” Id. at 1776. But see Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064,
2069–70 (2013) (distinguishing Stolt-Neilson and holding that an arbitrator did not exceed its authority by ruling that an arbitration agreement that did not expressly mention class arbitration nevertheless “expresses the parties’ intent that class arbitration can be maintained”).
107. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.
108. See id. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 1759.
110. Id. at 1760, 1762.
111. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 91, at 633–35 (describing the development of this
theory).
112. 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985).
113. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (acknowledging that
“the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant . . . from effectively vindicating
her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum”).
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ing an individual arbitration action prevents the effective vindication of
statutory rights. 114
A class of merchants mounted such a challenge against American Express Company (“American Express”), arguing the company violated the
Sherman Act by forcing the merchants to accept credit cards at rates approximately thirty percent higher than the fees for competing credit
cards. 115 American Express sought to compel individual arbitration of the
class members’ claims based on a class arbitration waiver in American Express’s agreements with the merchants. 116 In response, the merchants asserted the estimated costs for expert analysis to prove the antitrust claims
would be “at least several hundred thousand dollars, and might exceed $1
million,” most of which was non-recoupable, whereas an individual plaintiff’s maximum treble-damages recovery would be $38,549. 117 The arbitration costs, the merchants argued, were “plainly prohibitive” of the effective
vindication of the merchants’ rights.118 The district court granted American
Express’s motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the lawsuits.119 The
Second Circuit reversed, holding that because the merchants “would incur
prohibitive costs if compelled to arbitrate under the class action waiver,” the
waiver was unenforceable. 120
The Supreme Court considered this appeal in American Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant. 121 In a 5-3 decision, 122 the Court rejected the
plaintiffs’ arguments and held that the class arbitration waiver was enforceable. The Court emphasized that arbitration agreements must be “rigorous-

114. Gilles & Friedman, supra note 91, at 633–34 (dubbing this the “second wave” attack on
class action waivers); see also Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 61 (1st Cir. 2006) (“If the
class mechanism prohibition here is enforced, Comcast will be essentially shielded from private
consumer antitrust enforcement liability, even in cases where it has violated the law. Plaintiffs
will be unable to vindicate their statutory rights.”).
115. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Brief for Respondents at 17, Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (No. 12-133).
119. In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., No. 03 CV 9592(GBD), 2006 WL 662341, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2006), rev’d and remanded, 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010), rev’d and
remanded sub nom. In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 667
F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012).
120. In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 315–16 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted,
judgment vacated sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010), rev’d
and remanded sub nom. In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d,
667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012).
121. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
122. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, which Justices Roberts, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito joined. Id. at 2307. Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer,
dissented. Id. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the decision, as she served on the panel that decided the case in the Second Circuit. Id.
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ly enforce[d]” 123 and found nothing within the antitrust or class action laws
to undermine the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration.124 It
acknowledged the existence of an effective-vindication exception but held
that the exception applied only to cases in which an arbitration clause
amounts to a “prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies.” 125 The Court made clear that “the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.” 126 Accordingly, the Court held
that arbitration of the matter would not prevent the effective vindication of
statutory rights. 127
Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, mounted a
forceful dissent that characterized the majority opinion as a “betrayal of our
precedents, and of federal statutes like the antitrust laws.”128 The dissent
found the rejection of the effective-vindication defense improper, as “the
principle we have established fits this case hand in glove.” 129 Important to
the dissent’s reasoning was the text of the arbitration agreement, which
broadly prohibited not only class aggregation but also “other forms of costsharing . . . that could provide effective vindication.” 130 The dissent expressed concern that the majority’s holding creates avenues through which a
company might, through strategic drafting of arbitration agreements, eliminate any meaningful recourse for its misconduct.131
4. The Current State of Class Arbitration Waiver Jurisprudence
Taken together, Concepcion and Italian Colors Restaurant may sharply restrict the availability of class action relief when a class arbitration
waiver is present. These cases, along with other recent decisions heighten-

123. Id. at 2309 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
124. Id. at 2309–10 (“The antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the
vindication of every claim. . . . Nor does congressional approval of Rule 23 establish an entitlement to class proceedings for the vindication of statutory rights.”).
125. Id. at 2310 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 637 n.19 (1985)).
126. Id. at 2311.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2320.
131. Id. at 2314 (“On the front end: The agreement might set outlandish filing fees or establish
an absurd (e.g., one-day) statute of limitations, thus preventing a claimant from gaining access to
the arbitral forum. On the back end: The agreement might remove the arbitrator’s authority to
grant meaningful relief, so that a judgment gets the claimant nothing worthwhile. And in the middle: The agreement might block the claimant from presenting the kind of proof that is necessary to
establish the defendant’s liability—say, by prohibiting any economic testimony (good luck proving an antitrust claim without that!). Or else the agreement might appoint as an arbitrator an obviously biased person—say, the CEO of Amex.”).
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ing the standards for certifying a class,132 underscore an antipathy to the
class device held by a majority of Justices on the Supreme Court. In the
few years since Concepcion and Italian Colors Restaurant were decided,
many lower courts have applied this precedent expansively, 133 but some
have interpreted the cases in ways that preserve some vitality in the unconscionability and effective-vindication challenges. 134 The reactions of scholars and commentators to this precedent are similarly mixed: some believe
that businesses will now flock to arbitration clauses, effectively killing the
consumer class action, while others argue that the effects of these decisions
will be more muted. 135
The following Part analyzes these issues in the context of debtor class
action cases and argues that the effect of this case law should be minimal in
the bankruptcy arena. While the FAA’s pro-arbitration mandate is strong, it
is not absolute, and it must at times give way to countervailing federal interests. 136 The federal interests underlying the Bankruptcy Code have long
provided bankruptcy courts substantial discretion to avoid arbitration of
matters if arbitration would conflict with bankruptcy’s objectives. As such,
bankruptcy courts should adjudicate matters subject to a class arbitration
waiver when granting arbitration would prevent the vindication of bankruptcy rights.
III. THE FAA AND CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS IN BANKRUPTCY
The prior Part explored the strong federal policies underlying arbitration and the increasing power of class arbitration waivers as a shield to class
132. See infra Part IV.
133. Georgene Vairo, Is the Class Action Really Dead? Is That Good or Bad for Class Members?, 64 EMORY L.J. 477, 489–94 (2014) (discussing early application of Concepcion and Italian
Colors Restaurant); Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60
U. KAN. L. REV. 767, 770–93 (2012) (describing Concepcion’s impact).
134. See James Dawson, Contract After Concepcion: Some Lessons from the State Courts, 124
YALE L.J. 233, 234 (2014) (describing “innovative, narrow readings of Concepcion” adopted by
certain lower courts); Tina Wolfson & Bradley King, Even After Concepcion and Italian Colors,
Some Arbitration Agreements Are Not Enforceable, 62 FED. LAW. 19, 20–21 (2015) (discussing
means to challenge arbitration agreements after Concepcion and Italian Colors Restaurant).
135. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 727 (2012) (“Concepcion has caused a tsunami wave that is
threatening to eliminate many consumers’ and employees’ abilities to enforce their substantive
rights by participating in class actions. We must look primarily to Congress to take corrective
action . . . .”); Ian Millhiser, Supreme Court Nukes Consumers’ Rights in Most Pro-Corporate
PROGRESS
(Apr.
27,
2011),
Decision
Since
Citizens
United,
THINK
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2011/04/27/176997/scotus-nukes-consumers/ (“After Concepcion,
it is only a matter of time before nearly every credit card provider, cell phone company, mailorder business or even every potential employer requires anyone who wants to do business with
them to first give up their right to file a class action.”). But see Brian J. Murray, I Can’t Get No
Arbitration: The Death of Class Actions That Isn’t, at Least So Far, FED. LAW., September 2013,
at 62, 63 (“[T]he obituary for consumer and employee class actions remains to be written.”).
136. See infra Part III.B.
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action liability. This Part argues that this trend should have little relevance
to class actions brought in consumer bankruptcy cases. First, class arbitration waivers may not govern the matters at issue in many debtor class action
proceedings. 137 Second, even if a class arbitration waiver does apply, bankruptcy courts have discretion to refuse arbitration of many such matters under a well-established (but poorly defined) inherent conflict standard. 138
Finally, the “effective vindication of statutory rights” challenge, which the
Supreme Court constrained in its Italian Colors Restaurant decision, can
find new life as part of bankruptcy courts’ inherent conflict analysis. 139
Under this view of the inherent conflict analysis, it is appropriate for bankruptcy courts to refuse to compel arbitration of matters that would prevent
debtor classes from vindicating their bankruptcy rights.
The analysis in this Part, although technical, necessarily paints with a
broad brush. Debtor class action cases can present a host of claims, involving bankruptcy law, state or federal consumer protection laws, or other legal
rights. Moreover, as discussed below, the standard for determining whether
these proceedings are unsuitable for arbitration is fact intensive and highly
discretionary. This analysis thus suggests how courts could approach typical or common patterns in debtor class action cases. Considering the role
bankruptcy courts have historically played in achieving consumer justice, as
well as the salutatory effects that class actions might have on the enforcement of consumer bankruptcy laws, courts should construe their discretion
in a manner that enhances the debtor class action.
A. The Limited Force of Class Arbitration Waivers in Bankruptcy
As a preliminary matter, in order for class arbitration waivers to stand
as a bar to debtor class action relief, the dispute at issue must be governed
by an arbitration agreement that contains a class arbitration waiver. While
arbitration clauses are prevalent in a broad range of consumer contracts, 140
they are not pervasive. For example, much standard home loan documentation has historically not included arbitration provisions, given the unwillingness of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to buy certain mortgages loans
with arbitration clauses on the secondary market. 141 In addition, statutes
137. See infra Part III.A.
138. See infra Part III.B–C.
139. See infra Part III.D.
140. See CFPB FINAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 2:9-27, 45–46 (describing the incidence of
arbitration agreements and class arbitration waivers, respectively).
141. Banking—Mortgages: Fannie Mae Will Not Buy Home Mortgages with Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 72 U.S.L.W. 2463 (2004); Banking—Mortgages: Freddie Mac Will Not Buy Subprime Loans that Contain Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 72 U.S.L.W. 2342 (2003); see also R.
Wilson Freyermuth, Foreclosure by Arbitration?, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 459, 480 (2010) (“[S]tandard
mortgage forms do not contain arbitration clauses at all, or, if they do, they “carve out” foreclosure from their scope.”).
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such as the Military Lending Act and the Truth in Lending Act have limited
the use of arbitration clauses in a number of consumer contracts. 142 Finally,
at the time of this writing, the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau
(“CFPB”) has just completed a major empirical study of the use of arbitration agreements in consumer contracts.143 The agency is expected to promulgate new regulations on arbitration agreements, which may further reduce
the prevalence of class arbitration waivers and curtail the long-term impact
of Concepcion and Italian Colors Restaurant. 144
Even if an arbitration agreement is invoked in a debtor class action
case, the scope of the agreement might not be broad enough to encompass
bankruptcy-specific harms that debtor classes allege. Although arbitration
agreements generally are enforceable in bankruptcy, 145 even when the
claims are founded on statutory rights, 146 many bankruptcy-related causes
of action are distinct from the underlying contract. The Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of New York acknowledged as much in In re
Hostess Brands, Inc. 147 In that case, the court found that issues relating to a
corporate debtor’s use of cash collateral 148 were not subject to arbitration. 149
Although the underlying contract featured an arbitration agreement that
broadly covered “[a]ny controversy, dispute, claim, or question arising out
of or relating to this agreement,” 150 the court found that the use of cash collateral was a matter “not at all rooted in a right that exists pre-bankruptcy”
and was therefore beyond the scope of the arbitration clause. 151
Debtor class action proceedings might present similar scope issues.
Consider, for example, class action claims premised on violations of the
discharge injunction. Section 524 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a
142. The Military Lending Act prohibits arbitration clauses in connection with certain loans
made to members of the armed services. See 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2012). As of June 1, 2013, the
Truth in Lending Act bans mandatory arbitration provisions in all consumer contracts that are secured by a dwelling. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.36 (2014).
143. CFPB FINAL REPORT, supra note 74.
144. A number of state attorneys general have urged the agency to place additional regulations
on the use of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses for financial products or services, stating
that they “are concerned about such clauses and the class action prohibitions often associated with
them.” Letter from Joseph R. Biden, III, Del. Att’y Gen. et al., to Richard Cordray, Dir., CFPB 1
(Nov.
19,
2014),
http://www.attorneygeneral.delaware.gov/documents/20141119AGs_Ltr_to_CFPB_re_Arb_Clauses_Final.pdf.
145. See Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149, 1154 (3d
Cir. 1989) (holding that, for claims derivative of the debtor, the trustee is bound by the debtor’s
pre-petition agreement to arbitrate).
146. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987).
147. No. 12-22052-RDD, 2013 WL 82914 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2013).
148. The Bankruptcy Code defines cash collateral as “cash, negotiable instruments, documents
of title, securities, deposit accounts, or other cash equivalents . . . subject to a security interest.”
11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (2012).
149. In re Hostess Brands, Inc., 2013 WL 82914 at *4.
150. Id. at *1.
151. Id. at *3.
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discharge in bankruptcy “operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to
collect or recover from, or offset against, property of the debtor.”152 Certainly, a debt that has been discharged may have originated from a contract,
and the relevant contract might indeed contain an expansive arbitration
clause with a class arbitration waiver.153 But a court might well conclude
that the terms of the arbitration clause are not broad enough to encompass
the bankruptcy-based claims alleged.154
B. The FAA’s Goals Must, at Times, Yield to Bankruptcy Policy
If an arbitration clause in fact governs issues raised in a debtor class
action proceeding, the creditor-defendant might move for the dispute to be
resolved in arbitration. 155 As detailed above, many such motions are designed to give effect to class arbitration waivers,156 and particularly after
Concepcion and Italian Colors Restaurant, moving to compel arbitration
might successfully prevent a debtor class from aggregating their claims. 157
Nevertheless, debtor classes have a unique means to challenge arbitration
clauses based on the strong federal policies underlying the Bankruptcy
Code.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the FAA’s pro-arbitration
mandate, while strong, “may be overridden by a contrary congressional
command.” 158 Courts have long viewed matters central to the bankruptcy
process to provide such a command. Indeed, bankruptcy courts have broad
discretion to refuse to compel arbitration when arbitration of a matter would
inherently conflict with bankruptcy law or policy. 159 Courts have exercised
this type of discretion in cases in which the interests of other parties to the
152. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(3) (2012).
153. Some courts have found that arbitration clauses are unenforceable after the underlying
claim is discharged in bankruptcy. See Harrier v. Verizon Wireless Pers. Commc’ns LP, 903 F.
Supp. 2d 1281, 1283–84 (M.D. Fla. 2012); Jernstad v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, No. 11 C
7974, 2012 WL 8169889, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2012).
154. See, e.g., In re Rivers, No. 03-05671-NPO, 2010 WL 5375950, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Miss.
Dec. 22, 2010) (“[T]he Purported Class Action Waiver, even if applicable in litigation, is too narrow to cover the [bankruptcy-based] claims at issue in this Adversary.”); cf. In re Belton, No. 1223037 (RDD), 2014 WL 5819586, at *6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2014) (“[G]iven the broad
language of the arbitration provision here, it cannot be said that the parties clearly did not contemplate arbitration of all disputes related to the debt, including whether GE Capital has violated the
discharge of that debt.”).
155. See, e.g., In re Belton, 2014 WL 5819586, at *1 (creditor moved to compel arbitration);
In re Cavanaugh, 271 B.R. 414, 418 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) (same); In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821,
827 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999) (same).
156. See supra Part II.B; see also In re Rivers, 2010 WL 5375950, at *2 (creditor sought to
enforce only the class action waiver).
157. See supra Part II.B.3.
158. Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987).
159. See infra Part III.C.2.a–b.
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bankruptcy would not be served by arbitration, where arbitration of a matter
would undermine a debtor’s reorganization or affect the court’s ability to
distribute assets to creditors, and where the proceeding involves substantive
rights created by the Bankruptcy Code and central to the bankruptcy process. 160
The process of determining whether a bankruptcy dispute is unsuitable
for arbitration relies on a framework first established in Shearson/American
Express Inc. v. McMahon. 161 That case, which dealt with the intersection of
the FAA, the Securities Exchange Act, and the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act, established a test to determine whether “Congress intended to preclude” parties from waiving judicial remedies in favor
of arbitration. 162 If Congress intended to deny the availability of arbitration
of a statutory claim, such intent would “be deducible from [the statute’s]
text or legislative history, or from an inherent conflict between arbitration
and the statute’s underlying purposes.” 163 Courts that have applied
McMahon to the intersection of bankruptcy and arbitration have found little
guidance in the Bankruptcy Code’s text or legislative history that would
foreclose operation of arbitration clauses.164 Thus, courts’ analyses center
on whether arbitration of the dispute creates an “inherent conflict” with the
purpose or policies of the Bankruptcy Code.165
160. See infra Part III.C.2.b.
161. Shearson, 482 U.S. 220.
162. Id. at 227.
163. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
164. See, e.g., Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149,
1157 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Hays has pointed to no provisions in the text of the bankruptcy laws, and
we know of none, suggesting that arbitration clauses are unenforceable in a non-core adversary
proceeding in a district court to enforce a claim of the estate. . . . Similarly, Hays has identified no
legislative history indicating that this kind of proceeding was intended to be an exception to the
mandate of the Arbitration Act.”); see also In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 671 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th
Cir. 2012) (collecting cases).
165. For a comprehensive study of the inherent conflict test, see Alan N. Resnick, The Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses in Bankruptcy, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 183, 202 (2007).
A recent Supreme Court case, which dealt with the intersection of the FAA and the Credit Repair
Organization Act, might appear to condense McMahon’s three-prong inquiry to a single, plain
language test. See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 673 (2012) (“Because the
CROA is silent on whether claims under the Act can proceed in an arbitrable forum, the FAA requires the arbitration agreement to be enforced according to its terms.”). One bankruptcy court
has interpreted this case in a way that subverts McMahon’s inherent conflict test and finds arbitration agreements broadly enforceable in bankruptcy. See Blackburn v. Capital Transaction Grp.,
Inc., No. 2:13-CV-98, 2014 WL 923316, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 10, 2014) (“Likewise in this case,
because the Bankruptcy Code is silent on whether claims under the Act can proceed in an arbitrable forum, the FAA also requires the arbitration agreement to be enforced according to its terms,
and there is no need to apply an ‘inherent conflict’ test.”). While CompuCredit Corp. was drafted
in expansive terms, it does not directly speak to McMahon’s three-prong test or exhibit an intent to
overrule it. Moreover, since CompuCredit Corp. was decided, the Supreme Court has declined to
grant certiorari in a matter involving application of the McMahon test to a bankruptcy issue. See
Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Thorpe Insulation Co., 133 S. Ct. 119 (2012). If the Court were eager to over-
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Many bankruptcy courts begin McMahon’s inherent conflict analysis
by distinguishing between core and non-core claims. 166 Non-core bankruptcy claims typically have too limited of a connection to the bankruptcy
case to present an inherent conflict under McMahon. Thus, courts often
hold that the parties’ agreement to arbitrate should be respected.167 Core
bankruptcy claims are closely related to the goals of bankruptcy, yet most
courts have rejected a per se rule governing arbitration of core proceedings. 168 Rather, courts consider on a case-by-case basis whether arbitrating
rule McMahon’s inherent conflict test or limit its applicability in the bankruptcy context, it might
well have taken this opportunity to do so.
166. See Resnick, supra note 165, at 205–06. “Core” and “non-core” are jurisdictional terms
used to describe Article I bankruptcy judges’ authority to enter final judgments. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2603–04 (2011). “Core” bankruptcy proceedings are considered to be matters of substantive bankruptcy law, matters which would only come to light in a bankruptcy case.
“Non-core” proceedings are proceedings that could have been brought in a state or federal court if
the bankruptcy petition had not been filed. Cont’l Nat’l Bank v. Sanchez (In re Toledo), 170 F.3d
1340, 1348–49 (11th Cir. 1999); Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 97 (5th Cir. 1987). It
bears noting that the distinction between core and non-core matters has blurred as a result of the
Supreme Court’s 2011 ruling in Stern v. Marshall. See 131 S. Ct. at 2603–04. In Stern, the Court
held that some matters falling within the bankruptcy court’s core jurisdiction were not within the
court’s constitutional authority to resolve to final judgment. Id. at 2620. Following Stern, some
courts applying McMahon’s inherent conflict test have treated such unconstitutionally core matters as if they were non-core. See, e.g., In re Edwards, No. 13-02217-8-ATS, 2013 WL 5718565,
at *2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 21, 2013) (finding that when a matter is unconstitutionally core, “the
arbitration agreement should control”). Other courts have used the Stern decision as a justification
to rely less on the core/non-core distinction when applying the inherent conflict test. See, e.g., In
re Trinity Comm’ns, LLC, No. 09-13154, 2012 WL 1067673, at *14 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Mar. 14,
2012) (“Although the parties spend considerable effort debating whether the issues raised by the
parties are core or non-core . . . the court finds it more productive to follow the lead of other
courts . . . and conclude that the core/non-core distinction is not dispositive.”).
167. See, e.g., Hays, 885 F.2d at 1161 (finding arbitration of non-core adversary claims would
not “seriously jeopardize the objectives of the code,” and that the court did not have the discretion
to refuse to compel arbitration); see also Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Elec. Mach. Enters.,
Inc. (In re Elec. Mach. Enters., Inc.), 479 F.3d 791, 796 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Hays); In re
Crysen/Montenay Energy Co., 226 F.3d 160, 165–66 (2d Cir. 2000) (same); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v.
NGC Settlement Trust & Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp. (In re Nat’l Gypsum Co.), 118 F.3d 1056,
1066 (1997) (holding that the Hays ruling makes “eminent sense” and has been “universally accepted”). But see Mintze v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs. (In re Mintze), 434 F.3d 222, 229 (3d Cir. 2006)
(“The core/non-core distinction does not . . . affect whether a bankruptcy court has the discretion
to deny enforcement of an arbitration agreement.”); Henderson v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution,
L.L.C. (In re Huffman), 486 B.R. 343, 358 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2013) (“The Fifth Circuit . . . has
not foreclosed the possibility . . . that a bankruptcy court could deny arbitration of a noncore proceeding if the opposing party could show it would cause an inherent conflict of interest with the
Bankruptcy Code.”); AmeriCorp, Inc. v. Hamm, No. 2:11-CV-677-MEF, 2012 WL 1392927, at
*5 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 23, 2012) (“Although classified as a non-core proceeding, the unique set of
facts presented in this case, when considered in the aggregate, compel the Court to the conclusion
that arbitration of this dispute would seriously disturb the objectives of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy.”).
168. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Gypsum Co., 118 F.3d at 1067 (“Cognizant of the Supreme Court’s
admonition that, in the absence of an inherent conflict with the purpose of another federal statute,
the Federal Arbitration Act mandates enforcement of contractual arbitration provisions, we refuse
to find such an inherent conflict based solely on the [core] jurisdictional nature of a bankruptcy
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the dispute would inherently conflict with bankruptcy’s aims. The inherent
conflict test is a fact-specific inquiry, and the standard has developed raggedly among the various circuits.169 Despite well-reasoned calls to reform
this standard, neither Congress nor the Court has clarified the proper balance between bankruptcy and arbitration. 170
The Third and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals focus their inherent
conflict inquiry largely on the legal basis of the asserted claims. 171 In these
circuits, when a cause of action is derivative of a litigant’s bankruptcy
rights, “the importance of the federal bankruptcy forum provided by the
Code is at its zenith,” and the bankruptcy court has “significant discretion to
assess whether arbitration would be consistent with the purpose of the
[Bankruptcy] Code.” 172 In contrast, where a cause of action derives from a
debtor’s pre-bankruptcy contractual rights, the parties’ agreement to arbitrate generally should be respected.173 In the Fifth Circuit, this standard has
proceeding.”). But see In re Brown, 354 B.R. 591, 603 (D.R.I. 2006) (“The ‘core/non-core’ distinction represents the best approach for resolving conflicts between the FAA and the Bankruptcy
Code because it locates arbitration agreements precisely upon the same footing as other forms of
contracts, while at the same time heeding McMahon’s dictate that a waiver of judicial forum may
only be prohibited where, inter alia, an inherent conflict is present between arbitration and the
conflicting statute’s underlying purpose.”).
169. See In re Brown, 354 B.R. at 599 (noting the “widely-divergent” application of precedent
and “equally divergent” outcomes); Marianne B. Culhane, Limiting Litigation over Arbitration in
Bankruptcy, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 493, 494 (2009) (noting that despite courts having
considered these topics for over twenty years, “[n]o clear directions or bright line rules have
emerged”).
170. See, e.g., Paul F. Kirgis, Arbitration, Bankruptcy, and Public Policy: A Contractarian
Analysis, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 503, 541 (2009) (arguing to replace the inherent conflict
analysis with a standard based on bankruptcy litigants’ ability to effectively vindicate statutory
rights); Robert M. Lawless, Core and Not-So-Core Rhetoric About the Intersection of Arbitration
and Bankruptcy, 28 No. 7 BANKRUPTCY LAW LETTER 1 (2008) (arguing for a functional approach
to resolving inherent conflict questions); Resnick, supra note 165 (arguing for legislative change
to clarify the arbitrability of bankruptcy matters).
171. See In re Mintze, 434 F.3d at 231; In re Gandy, 299 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 2002); Nat’l
Gypsum, 118 F.3d at 1066. This standard has been adopted by courts in other circuits. See, e.g.,
In re Merrill, 343 B.R. 1, 9–11 (Bankr. D. Me. 2006) (applying Nat’l Gypsum and Mintze); In re
Cavanaugh, 271 B.R. 414, 424–26 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) (same); In re Transp. Assocs., Inc.,
263 B.R. 531, 535 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2001) (same). But see In re Payton Constr. Corp., 399 B.R.
352, 362 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009) (declining to adopt the Fifth Circuit’s analysis).
172. Nat’l Gypsum, 118 F.3d at 1068–69. In National Gypsum, for example, the Fifth Circuit
held that the bankruptcy court had discretion to resolve a declaratory judgment action regarding
whether collection efforts violated section 524(a)’s discharge injunction or the confirmation of the
debtor’s plan. Id. at 1071. The court noted that the action sought to be arbitrated “was restricted
entirely to the adjudication of federal bankruptcy issues” and permitting arbitration of these claims
“would be inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code.” Id. at 1070–71; see also In re Gandy, 299
F.3d at 498 (applying the National Gypsum standard to uphold the bankruptcy court’s decision to
deny arbitration in case where bankruptcy issues predominated and their resolution “implicates
matters central to the purposes and policies of the Bankruptcy Code”).
173. In In re Mintze, for example, the Third Circuit held that the debtor’s claims under The
Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) and various federal and state consumer-protection laws should be
arbitrated. 434 F.3d at 233. In so holding, the Third Circuit reversed the decisions of the bank-
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developed into a two-part test: whether “the underlying nature of a proceeding derives exclusively from the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code” and
whether “arbitration of the proceeding conflicts with the purpose of the
Code.” 174
The Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have taken a more fluid and
policy-driven approach to the inherent conflict test. These circuits look beyond the origin of claims to determine whether the substance of the dispute
mandates resolution in the bankruptcy arena.175 The Second Circuit, for example, has emphasized that bankruptcy courts must “carefully determine
whether any underlying purpose of the Bankruptcy Code would be adversely affected by enforcing an arbitration clause” based on a “consider[ation
of] conflicting policies.” 176 The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of New York recently described the court’s task as determining whether
core bankruptcy matters are “‘substantially’ core or truly a function of the
bankruptcy process.” 177
Courts in these circuits have found a variety of factors relevant to the
inherent conflict analysis. These factors principally include bankruptcy’s
strong policies in favor of centralization,178 protecting constituents from
piecemeal litigation,179 and permitting the court to enforce its own orders. 180
ruptcy court and district court, which found bankruptcy resolution proper because the matter
would affect other creditors with claims against the debtor’s estate. Id. at 227. “With no bankruptcy issue to be decided by the Bankruptcy Court,” the Third Circuit reasoned, “we cannot find
an inherent conflict between arbitration of Mintze’s federal and state consumer protection issues
and the underlying purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.” Id. at 231–32.
174. In re Gandy, 299 F.3d at 495.
175. See In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 671 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2012); MBNA Am. Bank v.
Hill, 436 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2006); Phillips v. Congelton, L.L.C. (In re White Mountain Mining
Co.), 403 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 2005). Each of these circuits takes a slightly different approach
to this analysis. For example, the Fourth Circuit appears more willing than the Second and Ninth
Circuits to adopt a bright line rule that would permit judges to refuse to enforce arbitration clauses
in all core proceedings. See In re White Mountain Mining Co., 403 F.3d at 169 (“The Second Circuit . . . did not deduce from the statutory text a congressional intent to prohibit entirely the arbitration of core issues . . . . There is the counter argument, however, that the statutory text giving
bankruptcy courts core-issue jurisdiction reveals congressional intent to choose those courts in
exclusive preference to all other adjudicative bodies, including boards of arbitration, to decide
core claims.”).
176. U.S. Lines, Inc. v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n (In re U.S. Lines, Inc.),
197 F.3d 631, 640–41 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149, 1161 (3d Cir. 1989)).
177. In re Hostess Brands, Inc., No. 12-22052-RDD, 2013 WL 82914, at *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 7, 2013).
178. See, e.g., In re White Mountain Mining Co., 403 F.3d at 170 (finding an inherent conflict
in an adversary proceeding involving the determination whether pre-petition cash advances were
debt or equity, based on the need to centralize proceedings in a chapter 11 reorganization).
179. See, e.g., In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 671 F.3d at 1023 (“Arbitration of a creditor’s claim
against a debtor, even if conducted expeditiously, prevents the coordinated resolution of debtorcreditor rights and can delay confirmation of a plan of reorganization.”); In re U.S. Lines, 197
F.3d at 641 (“[T]he bankruptcy court is the preferable venue in which to handle mass tort actions
involving claims against an insolvent debtor.”).
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But courts have also found relevant whether the outcome of the proceeding
would affect other creditors of the estate 181 or impair the reorganization
process; 182 whether the proceedings at issue implicate some central purpose
or purposes of the Bankruptcy Code; 183 and whether a bankruptcy court
might be better suited to handle the claim expeditiously184 or bring to the

180. MBNA Am. Bank, 436 F.3d at 108 (listing, among the objectives of bankruptcy to consider in an inherent conflict analysis, “the undisputed power of a bankruptcy court to enforce its own
orders” (quoting In re Nat’l Gypsum Co., 118 F.3d 1056, 1069 (5th Cir. 1997)); see also Hooks v.
Acceptance Loan Co., No. 2:10-CV-999-WKW, 2011 WL 2746238, at *5 (M.D. Ala. July 14,
2011) (“[I]t would seem anomalous to allow an arbitrator to construe a court’s order in a contempt
setting.”).
181. See, e.g., MBNA Am. Bank, 436 F.3d at 110 (holding that claims for violation of the automatic stay could be arbitrated because the estate had been fully administered and the debtor had
received a discharge from chapter 7); see also Sternklar v. Heritage Auction Galleries, Inc. (In re
Rarities Grp., Inc.), 434 B.R. 1, 11 (D. Mass. 2010) (permitting arbitration of fraudulent transfer
claim and noting that “[t]here do not appear to be any other creditors or third parties in these proceedings whose interests might be affected if the claims are resolved by arbitration”); In re Martin, 387 B.R. 307, 322 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2007) (finding an inherent conflict because the debtor’s
chapter 13 plan was “entirely contingent” on whether the claim at issue was secured or unsecured
and the case was “dead in the water” until that issue was resolved).
182. See, e.g., In re White Mountain Mining Co., 403 F.3d at 170 (lower court finding that
international arbitration would make it difficult for the debtor to obtain funding, undermine creditor confidence in the reorganization, affect the debtor’s business relationships, and add unnecessary costs and distractions not clearly erroneous); Ford Motor Cred. Co. v. Roberson, No. WDQ10-1041, 2010 WL 4286077, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 29, 2010) (concluding that because the outcome
of the proceeding will affect the debtor’s resources available to pay her debts, “[a]rbitration of the
claims against Ford would ‘substantially interfere with [her] efforts to reorganize’ efficiently”
(quoting In re White Mountain Mining Co., 403 F.3d at 170)).
183. In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 671 F.3d at 1022 (finding congressional intent that the bankruptcy court manage all aspects of a § 524(g) reorganization); In re Eber, 687 F.3d 1123, 1130–31
(9th Cir. 2012) (“[A]llowing an arbitrator to decide issues that are so closely intertwined with dischargeability would ‘conflict with the underlying purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.’”); In re
Huffman, 486 B.R. 343, 363 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2013) (highlighting that “Congress clearly contemplated the regulation of debt relief agencies . . . through the BAPCPA [Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act]” and refusing to compel arbitration of related matters); In
re Hostess Brands, Inc., No. 12-22052-RDD, 2013 WL 82914, at *3–4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7,
2013) (finding cash collateral issues to be unique to bankruptcy and invoking substantial bankruptcy rights that are central to the bankruptcy process); In re Arentson, 126 B.R. 236, 238
(Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1991) (“[T]his cause of action is exclusively related to a bankruptcy statute, 11
U.S.C. § 525(b), which provides an avenue of redress for discrimination solely because an individual has filed for bankruptcy relief. It is a cause of action that literally begs for resolution in a
bankruptcy forum.”).
184. In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 197 F.3d at 641 (“The need for a centralized proceeding is further
augmented by the complex factual scenario, involving multiple claims, policies and insurers.”); In
re Thorpe Insulation Co., 671 F.3d at 1023 (“Arbitration of a creditor’s claim against a debtor,
even if conducted expeditiously, . . . can delay confirmation of a plan of reorganization.”); In re
White Mountain Mining Co., 403 F.3d at 170 (highlighting in particular the potential harm of a
protracted international arbitration on the debtor’s pending reorganization, the ability of the bankruptcy court to resolve the matter expeditiously, and the ability of other parties to participate at
minimal cost). But see In re Bailey, No. 07-41381, 2009 WL 8592798, at *5 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
Oct. 8, 2009) (“The delay, expense, or inefficiency of bifurcated or piecemeal litigation is not sufficient . . . . Rather, the conflict must rise to the level of substantial interference with the reorgani-
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case a particular legal expertise or familiarity with the facts.185 The impact
any of these factors might have on the analysis varies greatly from case to
case.
C. Debtor Class Actions Under the Inherent Conflict Test
Debtor classes have brought a variety of causes of action against their
creditors, alleging violations of the Bankruptcy Code, federal and state consumer protection laws, or a blend of bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy
claims. Some of the most common bankruptcy-based allegations are that
(1) creditors violated Section 524’s discharge injunction through improper
practices involving reaffirmation agreements or other post-discharge debtcollection activities; 186 (2) creditors routinely filed proofs of claim that were
inaccurate,187 contained unlawful fees, 188 or failed to include necessary

zation, violation of substantive bankruptcy principles . . . or some other extraordinary interference
with or evisceration of bankruptcy policy.”).
185. See, e.g., In re Eber, 687 F.3d at 1131 (noting that the bankruptcy court has “special expertise” to determine dischargeability and familiarity with the case at hand); In re Huffman, 486
B.R. at 364 (“Of most concern to the Court is that arbitrators on the roster of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) need not be attorneys, much less attorneys experienced in bankruptcy law. . . . Here, the Court finds that arbitration is not an adequate and accessible substitute to
litigation in this forum, given the nature of the bankruptcy issues involved.”); AmeriCorp, Inc. v.
Hamm, No. 2:11-cv-677-MEF, 2012 WL 1392927, at *5 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 23, 2012) (refusing to
compel arbitration of non-core proceedings based on a fear that the defendant would have an unfair advantage in arbitration); In re Arentson, 126 B.R. at 238 (expressing concern that the New
York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers, who presided over the
arbitration, would not view the matter to be high priority and that the plaintiff may not have the
means to fairly compete with the defendant).
186. See, e.g., In re Padilla, 389 B.R. 409, 413 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008) (alleging that lender
demanded payment of pre-petition and pre-confirmation attorney’s fees in violation of the discharge injunction); In re Cline, 282 B.R. 686, 687 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (alleging lender collected
debts in violation of the automatic stay and discharge injunction); In re Beck, 283 B.R. 163, 165
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2002) (alleging that lender sought to collect discharged debt); In re Aiello, 231
B.R. 693, 699 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999) (alleging that lender strong-armed debtors into reaffirming
debts), aff’d sub nom. Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 257 B.R. 245 (N.D. Ill. 2000), aff’d, 239
F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2001); In re Wiley, 224 B.R. 58, 62–63 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998) (alleging that
lenders knowingly pursued discharged debts using an unfiled reaffirmation agreement); Nelson v.
Providian Nat’l Bank (In re Nelson), 234 B.R. 528, 532 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999) (alleging improper reaffirmation practices).
187. In re Simmons, 237 B.R. 672, 674 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999) (alleging lender has a practice
of filing proofs of claim that improperly characterize an undersecured loan as secured); In re Lenoir, 231 B.R. 662, 665–66 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999) (alleging that defendants knowingly overvalue
claims); In re Knox, 237 B.R. 687, 691 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999) (same).
188. In re Rojas, No. 07–70058, 2009 WL 2496807, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2009)
(arguing that proofs of claim included improper fees); In re Tate, 253 B.R. 653, 658 (Bankr.
W.D.N.C. 2000) (alleging lender routinely filed proof of claim with an improper “bankruptcy fee”
in violation of the contract, the Bankruptcy Code, and other consumer protection law); In re Sims,
278 B.R. 457, 461 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2002) (same); Bank United v. Manley, 273 B.R. 229, 231
(N.D. Ala. 2001) (same); In re Noletto, 280 B.R. 868, 870 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2001) (same); In re
Sheffield, 281 B.R. 24, 28 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2000) (same).
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documentation; 189 and (3) lenders misapplied plan payments or assessed secret fees for collection after discharge. 190 The variety of legal claims, combined with courts’ divergent and fact-intensive inherent conflict standards,
makes a thorough analysis of the arbitrability of debtor class action claims
difficult. Nevertheless, some useful generalizations can be drawn with respect to a prototypical debtor class action case—a case in which a class of
consumer debtors sues a common lender for widespread violations of bankruptcy law. 191
Under the Third and Fifth Circuits’ inherent conflict analysis, when
debtor class action claims involve violations of bankruptcy law, bankruptcy
courts’ discretion to refuse arbitration is “at its zenith.” 192 These courts are
almost certain to find an inherent conflict in the typical debtor class action
case. In addition, debtor class action claims tend to implicate central bankruptcy policies, which may lead courts in other circuits toward an inherent
conflict finding. Consumer bankruptcy is designed to further two policies:
to give “the honest but unfortunate debtor” a fresh start and to provide for
the fair treatment and distribution of assets to creditors.193 The conduct in
many debtor class actions violates these policies in significant ways. For
example, creditors filing inaccurate proofs of claim or collecting undisclosed fees might receive a greater share of the debtor’s limited assets vis-àvis other creditors, in contravention of bankruptcy’s distributional policies.
This conduct might also undermine the discharge—a hallmark of bankruptcy’s fresh-start policy—by leaving debtors in a vulnerable position after
bankruptcy. Lenders that misuse reaffirmation agreements, carry hidden
costs for collection after bankruptcy, or fail to remove discharged debt on a
credit report likewise undermine the discharge by prolonging the debtor’s
financial instability after the successful conclusion of a bankruptcy case.
Congress likely intended these claims, which run to the heart of the bankruptcy process, to be resolved by a bankruptcy court. Many courts have
189. See, e.g., Patrick v. Dell Fin. Servs., L.P. (In re Patrick), 344 B.R. 56, 58 (Bankr M.D.
Pa. 2005) (arguing that Dell Financial Services listed proofs of claim as secured without attaching
documentation required by Official Form 10).
190. In re Cano, 410 B.R. 506, 518 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (arguing lender misallocated plan
payments and assessed undisclosed fees for collection post-discharge); In re Rodriguez, 396 B.R.
436, 439 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008) (same).
191. Debtor class actions based on bankruptcy code violations are likely more prevalent, as
they have a greater likelihood of passing threshold jurisdictional challenges. While subject matter
jurisdiction over debtor classes is becoming less controversial in core matters, courts have
acknowledged that non-core, state-law claims present a more difficult case. See, e.g., In re Noletto, 244 B.R. at 857 (distinguishing cases premised on state law because it “changes the issues
and jurisdictional posture”).
192. In re Nat’l Gypsum Co., 118 F.3d 1056, 1068 (5th Cir. 1997).
193. Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913) (“It is the twofold purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to convert the estate of the bankrupt into cash and distribute it among creditors and
then to give the bankrupt a fresh start with such exemptions and rights as the statute left untouched.”).
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reached precisely this conclusion and refused to compel arbitration of these
matters. 194
A variety of factors might be present in a debtor class action case that
could lend additional support to a court’s inherent conflict finding. For example, parties in interest have broad rights of intervention in bankruptcy,
but would be ineligible to participate in an arbitration proceeding between
debtor and creditor. 195 Thus, permitting arbitration could, in some cases,
eliminate legal rights that would be available to third parties in bankruptcy. 196 Additionally, the arbitrators appointed might not be attorneys, let
alone attorneys with knowledge of bankruptcy law, and might not have the
experience to apply the law in a manner consistent with broader bankruptcy
policies. 197
One group of debtor class action proceedings—proceedings involving
Bankruptcy Code provisions where no express private right of action exists—is particularly ill-suited for arbitration. Courts typically find these
claims remediable either through civil contempt sanctions 198 or enforceable
by operation of the court’s equitable authority under Section 105 of the
Bankruptcy Code. 199 In either case, the means of punishing the alleged
194. See, e.g., supra note 183 (collecting cases where arbitration of matters central to the
bankruptcy process would give rise to an inherent conflict).
195. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7024 (right to intervene in adversary proceedings); John T. Hansen,
Pushing the Envelope of Creditors’ Committee’s Powers, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 89, 100–02 (2006)
(discussing intervention rights in adversary proceedings).
196. In re Belton, No. 12-23037-RDD, 2014 WL 5819586, at *4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10,
2014 (“Bankruptcy cases are predominantly collective, multi-party proceedings” and “thus, a
prepetition agreement between the debtor and a creditor that includes an arbitration provision may
not be said to cover disputes in a bankruptcy case that involve multiple new parties who did not
agree, pre-bankruptcy to arbitration and who have a statutory right to intervene under section
1109(b) of the Code.”).
197. In re Hermoyian, 435 B.R. 456, 465 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2010) (“[D]ischargeability and
other issues relating to the ‘fresh start’ [should be] determined in one forum with particularized
expertise to do so.” (quoting Holland v. Zimmerman (In re Zimmerman), 341 B.R. 77, 79–80
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006)); In re Oakwood Homes Corp., No. 02-13396PJW, 2005 WL 670310, at
*5 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 18, 2005) (“[C]ertain fact situations may be expected to bring about fairly
consistent results, wherever they are tried. To subject these matters to arbitration, before individuals or tribunals with little or no experience in bankruptcy law or practice, and with little or no
concern for the rights and interests of the body of creditors, of which the particular defendant is
only one, would introduce variables into the equation which could potentially bring about totally
inconsistent results.”).
198. Cox v. Zale Del., Inc., 239 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir. 2001) (suit for violation of section 524
may be brought as a contempt action); Pertuso v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 233 F.3d 417, 422–23
(6th Cir. 2000) (same). But see In re Joubert, 411 F.3d 452, 457 (3d Cir. 2005) (dismissing case
because no private right of action exists). Although courts diverge on the extent of Article I bankruptcy courts’ inherent powers, most courts acknowledge that bankruptcy judges possess some
form of civil contempt authority, whether inherent or statutorily granted. See generally 2 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY P. 105.02 (collecting cases).
199. See, e.g., Rojas v. Citi Corp Trust Bank FSB (In re Rojas), No. 07-70058, 2009 WL
2496807, at *10 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2009) (holding statutory contempt power under Section 105 permits courts to order monetary relief for violations of discharge injunction); In re Pa-
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conduct is directly linked with the exercise of judicial authority. It is either
vested in the courts by statute, as is the case with Section 105,200 or is
deemed an inherent component of the judicial role. 201 Courts and commentators have widely recognized that it would be improper to vest an arbitrator
with this degree of judicial authority. 202 Indeed, “the ability of a bankruptcy court to enforce its own orders” is an oft-cited factor in an inherent conflict analysis. 203 As such, for claims that seek remedies based on courts’
statutory or inherent powers, an inherent conflict is highly likely to be
found.
The fact that these claims are brought on a class-wide basis should, in
many instances, add further support to the finding of an inherent conflict.
In recent debtor class action cases, the allegations of systemic harm are
supported by the staggering incidence of such behavior. In some cases, discovery reveals corporate policies or communications that either permitted
or encouraged the alleged violations of bankruptcy law. 204 Compelling arbitration of each individual proceeding would fail to capture the broader
harms of such conduct on the bankruptcy system as a whole.205 As such,

dilla, 389 B.R. 409, 433 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008) (holding Section 105 remedies violations of Section 1327); In re Harris, 297 B.R. 61, 70 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2003) aff’d, 312 B.R. 591 (Bankr.
N.D. Miss. 2004) (holding Section 105 permits monetary relief for violations of Section
1322(b)(5)).
200. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) provides, “The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”
201. See supra notes 198–199 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., Hooks v. Acceptance Loan Co., No. 2:10-CV-999-WKW, 2011 WL 2746238,
*5 (M.D. Ala. July 14, 2011) (“[A]llowing arbitration of contempt proceedings would effectively
strip the courts of their primary enforcement mechanism.”); In re Cavanaugh, 271 B.R. 414, 426
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) (“Enforcement of the arbitration clause under these circumstances would
be an abrogation of this Court’s obligation to construe and enforce the injunction issuing under its
authority and to determine the parties’ rights and obligations under bankruptcy law.”).
203. Michael D. Sousa, A Morass of Federal Policy: Enforcing Arbitration Agreements in
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 15 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3 Art. 2 (2006) (collecting cases that find relevant to an inherent conflict analysis “the undisputed power of a bankruptcy court to enforce its
own orders”).
204. See, e.g., In re Harris, 280 B.R. 876, 880 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2001) (“It was First Union’s
policy not to disclose the proof of claim fees on the proofs of claim and its attorneys have been so
instructed in writing.”); Mark J. Balthazard, The Criminal Side of Sears, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULL.,
Aug. 1999, at 71, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2006/06/30/usab4704.pdf
(noting that an internal manual used by Sears’ employees advised that reaffirmation agreements
should not be filed before bankruptcy judges that regularly rejected such agreements based on a
belief that they were not in the debtor’s best interest).
205. See, e.g., In re Bethlehem Steel Corp., 390 B.R. 784, 794–95 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(“Facts common to many or most of the many hundreds of remaining adversary proceedings being
prosecuted by the Liquidating Trust are likely to control the outcomes of these four adversary proceedings. Uniformity in application of the law to the facts in these federal statutory claims is furthered by federal court litigation and not arbitration.”).

2016]

VINDICATING BANKRUPTCY RIGHTS

475

bankruptcy courts will likely find arbitration unsuitable for claims alleging
systematic bankruptcy abuse. 206
One of the few courts to have considered debtor class actions in the
context of an inherent conflict analysis, MBNA American Bank v. Hill, improperly found the class-wide nature of the action to weigh against an inherent conflict. 207 In Hill, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
found arbitration appropriate because, among other things, the debtor’s estate had been fully administered, resolution of her claim would not affect
other creditors of the estate, and the debtor had received a fresh start in
bankruptcy and was no longer under the protection of the automatic stay. 208
The court then added, “as a purported class action, Hill’s claims lack the direct connection to her own bankruptcy case that would weigh in favor of
refusing to compel arbitration.” 209
This statement misconstrues the inherent conflict standard. The inherent conflict test examines conflicts between bankruptcy law and arbitration,
not conflicts between a bankruptcy debtor and her individual case. Moreover, as noted above, debtor class action claims frequently will involve questions of systemic abuse, which demand a comprehensive resolution that
likely is not available outside of bankruptcy. The facts of Hill may well
have been insufficient to create an inherent conflict. Yet, to the extent Hill
stands for the premise that debtor class claims undermine a finding of an
inherent conflict, it is wrongly decided.
In sum, a number of factors suggest that courts may find the typical
debtor class action case to be unsuitable for arbitration under the inherent
conflict test. Although the foregoing discussion focused on debtor classes
that allege violations of bankruptcy law, courts have the discretion to find,
in appropriate cases, that arbitration of non-bankruptcy causes of action
would likewise give rise to an inherent conflict. 210 Yet the outcome of any
inherent conflict analysis is uncertain, as courts exercise considerable discretion when applying this test. As one commentator noted, the inherent
conflict test is “so vague and malleable that [it] give[s] courts license to do
almost anything they want.” 211 Moreover, in light of the Supreme Court’s
strong embrace of the FAA in disputes covered by class arbitration waivers,
206. See, e.g., In re Belton, No. 12-23037-RDD, 2014 WL 5819586, at *10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 10, 2014) (“[C]omplete and consistent relief is more likely to occur if it is determined by—
and with the possible remedial supervision of—a bankruptcy court than on an arbitration-byarbitration basis of separate alleged violations of the discharge.”).
207. See MBNA Am. Bank v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2006).
208. Id. at 109.
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., AmeriCorp, Inc. v. Hamm, No. 2:11-CV-677-MEF, 2012 WL 1392927, at *5
(M.D. Ala. Apr. 23, 2012) (highlighting how the trustee’s non-core breach-of-contract claim bears
such impact on the debtor’s bankruptcy case that arbitration would give rise to an inherent conflict).
211. Kirgis, supra note 170, at 520.
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bankruptcy courts might feel pressured to construe the inherent conflict test
more narrowly in debtor class action cases than in other contexts.
In light of this uncertainty, the following Section makes the affirmative case that courts should consider debtor classes’ ability to vindicate
bankruptcy rights as a central factor of McMahon’s inherent conflict analysis. If permitting a claim to be resolved in arbitration would eliminate an
affordable procedural path for debtor classes to remedy violations of bankruptcy law or otherwise achieve consumer bankruptcy’s goals, bankruptcy
courts should refuse to compel arbitration of the dispute.
D. Ensuring the Effective Vindication of Bankruptcy Rights Through
the Inherent Conflict Analysis
Ordering arbitration of a debtor class action could make it financially
infeasible for a class of debtors to find recourse for conduct that violates
their bankruptcy rights. Although this reality is most pronounced when
compelling arbitration would give effect to a class arbitration waiver, it
could conceivably be present if the debtors’ up-front costs to a class-wide
arbitration proceeding are prohibitive. This Section argues that when ordering arbitration would impede a debtor class’s ability to vindicate bankruptcy rights, courts should find that an inherent conflict exists.
As noted above, courts construing the inherent conflict test in bankruptcy must balance the competing federal policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code and the FAA. Although the test varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, at its base the inquiry focuses on how arbitrating a matter might
interfere with bankruptcy’s goals. 212 For example, courts have refused to
compel arbitration if arbitration would “make it very difficult for the debtor
to attract additional funding . . . , undermine creditor confidence . . . , impose additional costs on the estate, and divert the attention and time of the
debtor’s management.” 213 Conversely, courts have found arbitration appro212. This focus is clear in the more policy-driven analyses of the Second, Fourth, and Ninth
Circuits, but it likewise motivates, at least in part, courts’ analyses in the Third and Fifth Circuits.
See, e.g., In re Gandy, 299 F.3d 489, 499 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding an inherent conflict, in part, because the remedy of substantive consolidation “may be out of reach in arbitration”); Hays & Co.
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149, 1161 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[W]e must
carefully determine whether any underlying purpose of the Bankruptcy Code would be adversely
affected by enforcing an arbitration clause and that we should enforce such a clause unless that
effect would seriously jeopardize the objectives of the Code.”); see also In re Brown, 354 B.R.
591, 599 (D.R.I. 2006) (summarizing several circuit-level decisions on this issue by noting that
“each [court] looks to what kind of dispute is at issue and how arbitration of the dispute will affect
the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code and the FAA”).
213. Phillips v. Congleton, L.L.C. (In re White Mountain Mining Co.), 403 F.3d 164, 170 (4th
Cir. 2005); see also U.S. Lines, Inc. v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n (In re U.S.
Lines, Inc.), 197 F.3d 631, 641 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[A]rbitration of the disputes raised in the Complaint would prejudice the Trust’s efforts to preserve the Trust as a means to compensate claimants.” (quoting U.S. Lines, Inc. v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n, 169 B.R. 804, 825
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994))); In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 671 F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Ar-
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priate when it “would not interfere with or affect the distribution of the estate.” 214 As part of this ends-focused inquiry, courts naturally must consider the financial ramifications of ordering a class of consumer debtors to pursue their claims in arbitration. 215
In Italian Colors Restaurant, the Supreme Court rejected similar financial considerations in the context of an effective vindication challenge to
a class arbitration waiver.216 In so doing, the Court refused to “tally[] the
costs and burdens” of resolving claims in arbitration when deciding whether
to enforce an arbitration clause.217 This holding should not, however, have
any bearing on bankruptcy courts’ inherent conflict analysis. Italian Colors
Restaurant involved the intersection of the FAA and the Sherman Act,
which courts have long held does not present a conflict with the FAA under
any prong of McMahon. 218 Moreover, the effective vindication-exception is
a functional test; it considers only whether arbitration would impede a litigant’s ability to assert her statutory rights. 219 The inherent conflict test is a
broader and more nuanced inquiry, 220 balancing the underlying purposes of
competing federal statutes to determine whether arbitration or a conflicting
federal policy should prevail. 221 When balancing the competing policies of
bitration of a creditor’s claim against a debtor, even if conducted expeditiously, prevents the coordinated resolution of debtor-creditor rights and can delay the confirmation of a plan of reorganization.”).
214. MBNA Am. Bank v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2006).
215. Compare In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 845 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999) (“A debtor who has
filed a bankruptcy petition generally cannot afford arbitration fees. . . . Monies used to pay for
arbitration will mean less money to fund the plan and pay creditors. The existence of these actual
conflicts permit this Court to exercise its discretion and deny arbitration.”), with In re Durango
Ga. Paper Co., 309 B.R. 394, 402 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2004) (finding arbitration appropriate where
debtor failed to show that it would impose greater expense or delay than a bankruptcy-court resolution).
216. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013).
217. Id. (“The regime established by the Court of Appeals’ decision would require—before a
plaintiff can be held to contractually agreed bilateral arbitration—that a federal court determine
(and the parties litigate) the legal requirements for success on the merits claim-by-claim and theory-by-theory, the evidence necessary to meet those requirements, the cost of developing that evidence, and the damages that would be recovered in the event of success. Such a preliminary litigating hurdle would undoubtedly destroy the prospect of speedy resolution that arbitration in
general and bilateral arbitration in particular was meant to secure.”).
218. See id. at 2310. Indeed, before the Italian Colors Court rejected challenges to class arbitration waivers based on the effective-vindication theory, the Court first held that Congress had
not demonstrated its intent that claims should be non-arbitrable based on a competing federal policy. Id.
219. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000).
220. See Ferguson v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 733 F.3d 928, 936 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The effective
vindication and inherent conflict exceptions are two sides of the same coin—the former turning on
the ability to vindicate a statute, and the latter turning on the underlying purposes of a statute.”).
221. See AmeriCorp, Inc. v. Hamm, No. 2:11-cv-677-MEF, 2012 WL 1392927, at *3 (M.D.
Ala. Apr. 23, 2012) (“Although not explicitly stated in the case law, it is self-evident that the ‘inherent conflict’ test requires a balancing of the legislative interests in play in a particular case.”);
Kirgis, supra note 170, at 516 (noting that courts applying the inherent conflict test “essentially
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bankruptcy and arbitration, courts naturally have considered—and should
continue after Italian Colors Restaurant to consider—how the cost to the
debtor of ordering arbitration might affect bankruptcy policy.
Applying the inherent conflict test in this manner is consistent with the
Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence. Although the Supreme
Court has repeatedly emphasized that “courts must rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms,” 222 this principle has limited
applicability in the bankruptcy arena, where the very purpose is to adjust
pre-bankruptcy contractual rights to reach a global resolution of a debtor’s
financial distress. 223 Relatedly, the FAA’s policies are designed to protect
the interests of parties that have contracted for arbitration, but bankruptcy is
a multi-party enterprise involving a variety of interests beyond the interests
of parties to a given arbitration clause.224 Although the FAA’s freedom-ofcontract principles have been strongly supported by the Supreme Court, the
Court also developed the inherent conflict test to address precisely these
types of policy conflicts. Properly applied, the inherent conflict test should
permit arbitration to prevail over issues that are essentially two-party disputes and that do not affect the bankruptcy case, and find that bankruptcy
trumps the FAA for matters that bear directly on bankruptcy’s goals.
In both Concepcion and Italian Colors Restaurant, however, the majority of the Court not only promoted arbitration, but derided class-wide arbitration as slower and less efficient than traditional arbitration.225 Yet it
does not follow that bankruptcy court resolution of debtor class claims will
be similarly inefficient. The bankruptcy process, like traditional arbitration,
is well-suited to handle claims quickly and with minimal litigation costs.226
balance the policy in favor of arbitration against the policy in favor of consolidated and expedited
bankruptcy resolution”).
222. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2309 (quoting Dean Willer Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470
U.S. 213, 221 (1985)); see also AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745
(2011).
223. See Mette Kurth, Comment: An Unstoppable Mandate and an Immovable Policy: The
Arbitration Act and the Bankruptcy Code Collide, 43 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 999, 1030 (1996). Bankruptcy’s effect on contract rights can be observed in a number of instances, such as the avoidance
of prepetition transfers, the assumption or rejection of executory contracts, the invalidation of ipso
facto clauses, and the discharge itself. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 324, 365(e), 544, 727 (2012).
224. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Coming Encounter: International Arbitration
and Bankruptcy, 67 MINN. L. REV. 595, 607–09 (1983) (explaining how bankruptcy policy avoids
the diminution of the debtor’s assets through judgments obtained in other forums during the pendency of the bankruptcy case).
225. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2312 (“[T]he switch from bilateral to class arbitration . . . sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and makes the process
slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment.” (quoting
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751)).
226. Stephen J. Ware, Similarities Between Arbitration and Bankruptcy Litigation, 11 NEV.
L.J. 436, 438 (2011) (noting bankruptcy litigation “tends to move more quickly than nonbankruptcy litigation, with a shortened discovery process and an earlier hearing,” leading to lower
process costs).
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Moreover, unlike arbitration panels, bankruptcy courts have extensive experience dealing with massive cases and may have some expertise with class
certification standards.227 Thus, to the extent businesses contract for arbitration to realize the benefits of efficiency and speed, these goals may be
satisfied in bankruptcy class action adversary proceedings.
In sum, it is consistent with both the language and the spirit of Supreme Court precedent to revive effective vindication’s financial considerations in the context of McMahon’s inherent conflict analysis. In so doing, if
arbitration would undermine a debtor class’s ability to vindicate bankruptcy
rights, an inherent conflict should be found. Although determining whether
bankruptcy rights would be undermined by arbitration is a fact-intensive
consideration, the presence of a class arbitration waiver, prohibitive arbitration costs, or other impediments that affect bankruptcy’s aims would seem
to indicate that an inherent conflict exists.
IV. CERTIFYING A DEBTOR CLASS
The prior Part argued class arbitration waivers should be unenforceable in bankruptcy under McMahon’s inherent conflict test when arbitration
of a matter would preclude the vindication of bankruptcy rights. But even
if debtor class actions survive challenges based on class arbitration waivers,
class litigants must still face the rigors of class certification. Bankruptcy
Rule 7023 incorporates Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
adversary proceedings. 228 Accordingly, purported classes must satisfy Rule
23’s requirements of numerosity, 229 commonality, 230 typicality, 231 and adequacy of representation, 232 as well as one or more of Rule 23(b)’s requirements, 233 to be certified. Over the last several years, federal courts have
ratcheted up the evidentiary standards for class certification, requiring more

227. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is incorporated into the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7023.
228. Id.
229. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (The potential class must be “so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable.”).
230. Id. at 23(a)(2) (requiring the potential class to raise common questions of law or fact).
231. Id. at 23(a)(3) (“[T]he claims and defenses of the representative parties [must be] typical
of the claims or defenses of the class.”).
232. Id. at 23(a)(4) (requiring that class representatives “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class”).
233. Rule 23(b)(1) is appropriate if prosecuting the actions separately would create a risk of
inconsistent results that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing
the class or absent class members. Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate when the claimants seek primarily
declaratory or injunctive relief in cases where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to
act on grounds that apply generally to the class.” Id. at 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b)(3) applies when
common questions of law or fact predominate and the class action is a superior method of adjudication. Typically, consumer claims are asserted under subjection (b)(2) or (b)(3).
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proof at the class certification stage than previously required.234 In addition, a line of recent decisions has made various elements of certification
markedly more difficult to achieve. 235 As a result, lenders’ attorneys have
multiple avenues to prevent certification in debtor class action cases.236
But despite these trends, many debtor class actions may be able to run
the gantlet of modern class certification.237 Indeed, the most troubling examples of lender behavior in bankruptcy involve violations of debtors’
rights as a general business practice or matter of policy. 238 Quite frequently, examples of overreaching take the form of a routine assessment of fees,
form agreement, or other standardized practice or procedure. 239 These types
of claims are well-suited to satisfy even the stringent certification standards
of modern class actions.
A thorough analysis of the certification of debtor class claims, particularly in light of the variety of potential debtor class causes of action, exceeds the scope of this Article. This Part instead addresses, in general
terms, how debtor class actions may fare under modern class certification
requirements. First, few debtor class action cases will have trouble meeting
the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a). 240 Large lenders often have
hundreds of customers in bankruptcy proceedings at any given time, 241 and
abusive practices might go on for years before they are discovered or class
234. See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729 (2013)
(describing these trends).
235. See id.
236. Id.
237. See, e.g., In re Rodriguez, 695 F.3d 360, 366–67 (5th Cir. 2012) (affirming bankruptcy
court’s certification of debtor class); Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, In
re Brannan, 485 B.R. 443 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2013) (certifying a class of debtors alleging robosigning violations).
238. See, e.g., In re Rodriguez, 432 B.R. 671, 701 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010) (holding lender’s
practice of assessing fees ignored Bankruptcy Rule 2016(a)), aff’d, 695 F.3d 360; In re Noletto,
281 B.R. 36, 42 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2000) (finding commonality because “counsel charged a set fee
in the cases and followed a pattern or several patterns in dealing with postpetition/preconfirmation
actions in chapter 13 bankruptcy cases”).
239. See, e.g., In re Harris, 280 B.R. 876, 880 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2001) (“It was First Union’s
policy not to disclose the proof of claim fees on the proofs of claim and its attorneys have been so
instructed in writing.”).
240. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). While more than forty class members is often found to be sufficient to establish numerosity, bankruptcy courts may require a higher threshold due to their experience handling large numbers of litigants. See, e.g., In re TWL Corp., 712 F.3d 886, 895 (5th
Cir. 2013) (noting that numerosity might be more difficult to satisfy for a class of employee creditors because normal bankruptcy procedures are designed to deal with large numbers of claims).
241. See, e.g., In re Rodriguez, 432 B.R. at 693 n.29 (certifying a 125-person class from a pool
of approximately 750 debtors in the Southern District of Texas who might have been subject to
the alleged wrongdoing); In re Harris, 280 B.R. at 880 (finding numerosity is satisfied because
“[t]here will be hundreds or thousands of potential class members in all states”); Conley v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 222 B.R. 181, 183 (D. Mass. 1998) (describing Sears affidavit listing 2,733 bankruptcy cases in Massachusetts in which it used unfiled reaffirmation agreements between 1995 and
1997).
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action remedies are sought.242 These classes are also ascertainable, as bankruptcy court dockets are publically available, and counsel can easily search
for cases in which a certain lender was a party. 243 The typicality and adequacy of representation requirements of Rule 23(a) present no unique issues
in debtor class action cases.
The commonality requirement may pose challenges for certain debtor
classes, particularly in the wake of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes. 244 In
Dukes, the Supreme Court found that a class of 1.5 million current and former female Wal-Mart employees, who alleged violations of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, failed to establish commonality. 245 The Court
noted that “‘[w]hat matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of
common “questions”—even in droves—but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of
the litigation.’” 246 After Dukes, courts tend to look for a common conduct,
policy, or practice that underlies the claims of putative class members in order to find the commonality factor satisfied.247 As noted above, in many
debtor class action cases, the harm alleged is premised on standard forms,
routine practices, or other systematic conduct by large, institutional lenders. 248 In some cases, policy manuals or written instructions delineate the
abusive conduct. 249 For matters premised on federal bankruptcy laws,
choice-of-law issues will infrequently arise. 250

242. See, e.g., In re Brannan, 485 B.R. at 448 (certifying a class of Wells Fargo defendants
alleging bankruptcy abuse that occurred from 1996 to 2008). Moreover, courts may find the small
value of many debtor class action claims to weigh in favor of numerosity, as individual class
members might lack the resources or motivation to file a separate action. Id.; see also In re Rodriguez, 432 B.R. at 693–94 (finding numerosity satisfied based on the number of plaintiffs, the
existence of small claims, and considerations of judicial economy).
243. See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013); MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 23.21 (stating the implied condition to certification that an identifiable class must exist); see also Pacer Case Locator, https://pcl.uscourts.gov/search (last visited Aug. 9, 2015) (allowing for searches by party name).
244. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
245. Id. at 2552.
246. Id. at 2551 (alteration in original) (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in
the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)).
247. 5-23 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL § 23.23 (“Some courts have concluded that
Wal-Mart heightened the standards for establishing commonality.”).
248. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
250. In re Sheffield, 281 B.R. 24, 28 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2000) (“There is no choice of law issue
involved since the only issues raised by the potential class are federal bankruptcy law issues.”); In
re Noletto, 281 B.R. 36, 42 (2000) (same). But see Peterson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Peterson), 281 B.R. 685, 689 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2002) (finding class certification inappropriate because of differences in jurisdictions recognizing the right to allow debts to “ride through” the
bankruptcy case); In re Walls, 262 B.R. 519, 525–26 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2001) (same).
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Even in cases in which individualized issues exist, 251 a flawed process
for handling cases might provide the necessary commonality. In In re
Brannan, for example, the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Alabama certified a class of debtors who sought to enjoin Wells Fargo from
preparing unreliable affidavits to support relief from stay motions. 252 Although the impact of this behavior varied across the class—notably, many
affidavits, although “robo-signed,” were factually correct—the court found
common issues to be present. 253 “If every affidavit was prepared pursuant
to a tainted process, every affidavit was untrustworthy at the time the court
and debtors relied on it.” 254 For these reasons, even under Dukes’ “rigorous” standard, commonality in debtor class actions may be found.
Most debtor class action cases that have achieved class certification
have done so under Rule 23(b)(2), which requires that the defendant “has
acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate.” 255
Cases that allege systematic misconduct have achieved certification under
this standard when they seek a broad injunction that covers a common conduct in a wide range of cases.256 While money damages are theoretically
251. See, e.g., In re Powe, 278 B.R. 539 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2002) (decertifying class for remaining issue of the reasonableness of fees because the class lacked commonality); In re Harris,
280 B.R. 876, 885 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2001) (finding the issue of reasonableness of fees to fail
commonality and typicality grounds); see also In re Aiello, 231 B.R. 693, 712 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1999) (“There is no commonality . . . in the issue of compensation for actual damage . . . . For
example, some letter recipients may claim no damage, some may claim attorney’s fees incurred in
responding to the letter, some may seek to recover payments made under invalid reaffirmation
agreements, some . . . may claim emotional distress, and still others may claim some combination
of such damages.”), aff’d sub nom. Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 257 B.R. 245 (N.D. Ill. 2000),
aff’d, 239 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2001).
252. In re Brannan, 485 B.R. 443, 450–51 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2013) (“The facts alleged are that
affidavits were not reviewed carefully by affiants and notarization was done in a manner that
flaunted state law regarding notaries public. What the court relied on—the affiant’s word and the
notary’s attestation—are untrue on a consistent basis. One or both parts of the affidavit process—
affiant swearing of his/her personal knowledge to the truth of the facts in an affidavit and affiant
doing such swearing in the presence of a notary public who signed according to state law—did not
occur.”).
253. Id. at 457. The court also rejected Wells Fargo’s contention that no policy applicable to
all class members existed and that commonality was therefore not present. “This production of
affidavits without proper supervision and oversight and in numbers too large to allow due care is
the policy at issue.” Id. at 457–58.
254. Id. at 457.
255. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
256. See, e.g., In re Brannan, 485 B.R. at 459 (holding, on motion for reconsideration, that
injunctive class may be certified to enjoin Wells Fargo from profiting from longstanding misconduct); In re Death Row Records, Inc., No. 06-11205, 2012 WL 952292, at *12 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
Mar. 21, 2012) (certifying a (b)(2) class to determine trustees’ rights to escheated funds); In re
Rodriguez, 432 B.R. 671, 710 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010) (certifying (b)(2) class to enjoin Countrywide’s bankruptcy practices), aff’d, 695 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2012); In re Harris, 280 B.R. at 883
(certifying class seeking primarily injunctive relief—to have an improper fee “wiped off their account balances”).
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available under this provision, Dukes makes clear that they must be incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief sought.257 Many such litigants
have declined to seek individualized damages or disgorgement, as measuring such damages complicates the certification inquiry. 258
Debtor classes may seek damages under Rule 23(b)(3), which permits
money damages in cases in which “questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members,” and a class-wide resolution is “superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” 259 After the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, however, it has
arguably become more difficult to certify cases in which individual questions of damages predominate. 260 In Comcast, a class of cable service subscribers sought damages for alleged antitrust violations by their cable provider. 261 The plaintiffs’ model for calculating damages was based, in part,
on theories of liability that had been rejected at the lower court level. 262
The Court underscored that courts must undertake a “rigorous analysis” of
Rule 23’s standards and indicated the predominance requirement cannot be
satisfied where “[q]uestions of individual damage calculations will inevitably overwhelm questions common to the class.” 263 Because the plaintiffs
did not demonstrate that damages were “susceptible of measurement across
the entire class,” the Court reversed the lower courts’ orders permitting certification. 264 Four dissenting Justices took pains to underscore that “the
opinion breaks no new ground on the standard for certifying a class action . . . [and] should not be read to require . . . that damages attributable to
a classwide injury be measurable on a class-wide basis.” 265 Yet courts have
struggled to define the reach of Comcast, particularly outside the context of
antitrust suits. 266
257. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
258. See, e.g., In re Rodriguez, 695 F.3d at 366–67 (affirming bankruptcy court’s certification
of (b)(2) class that avoided individualized damages, and noting “[t]he focus is properly upon
Countrywide’s fee assessment and collection practice, not on the individualized manner in which
each class member may have been affected by the practices”).
259. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). The court, when measuring these predominance and superiority
factors, should consider “the class members’ interests in individually controlling . . . separate actions”; “the extent and nature of any litigation . . . begun by or against class members”; “the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum”; and
“the likely difficulties in managing a class action.” Id.
260. See 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432–33 (2013).
261. Id. at 1429–30.
262. Id. at 1430.
263. Id. at 1432–33.
264. Id. at 1433.
265. Id. at 1436 (Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J., dissenting).
266. Compare Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 514 (9th Cir. 2013) (distinguishing
Comcast), with Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp., No. 3:10–CV-0591 (TJM/DEP), 2013 WL 1316452,
at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2013) (applying Comcast to find predominance element unsatisfied
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Many debtor class action cases, particularly those that involve the improper assessment of fees, seek damages that can easily be calculated using
lenders’ accounting programs and software. In this context, courts may distinguish Comcast and find the predominance inquiry satisfied.267 For example, in Levya v. Medline Industries, Inc., the Ninth Circuit noted that
“unlike in Comcast . . . , damages will be calculated based on the wages
each employee lost due to Medline’s unlawful practices.”268 Because the
lost wages were easily tallied using defendant’s computerized payroll and
timekeeping database, the court found the class could be certified.269
In cases in which damages inquiries are more individualized, courts
might instead use Rule 23(c)(4) to certify a class with respect to the issue of
liability only. 270 This Rule provides that “[w]hen appropriate, an action
may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.” 271 Some courts and commentators have speculated that such a bifurcated approach might become a primary means to preserve the class action
model in the wake of Comcast. 272 In the debtor class action context, the
Fifth Circuit has recently affirmed the use of Rule 23(c)(4) to certify a class
of debtors seeking injunctive relief, leaving the issue of damages to be resolved separately. 273

when no common formula for calculating damages exists), and In re Motor Fuel Temperature
Sales Practices Litig., 292 F.R.D. 652, 676 (D. Kan. 2013) (certifying a class as to liability only);
see also Jacob v. Duane Reade, Inc., 293 F.R.D. 578, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (collecting cases).
267. See, e.g., Leyva, 716 F.3d at 514; In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 289 F.R.D. 555,
582 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (characterizing Comcast as requiring that the methodology of proving damages must be tied to liability).
268. 716 F.3d at 514.
269. Id.; see also Parra v. Bashas’, Inc., 291 F.R.D. 360, 393 (D. Ariz. 2013) (holding grocery
store employees’ calculation of back pay met the predominance element because “through a computer program, and relying on ‘objective factors’ . . . the plaintiffs will be able to calculate back
pay losses for ‘each eligible class member’”). In contrast, in Cowden v. Parker & Associates,
Inc., the plaintiffs’ claims that the employer withheld commissions and charged excessive fees
were found unsuitable for certification because “[p]laintiffs have offered no manageable way to
calculate damages across the entire class and the individual damages calculations that would be
required will inevitably overwhelm any questions common to the entire class.” No. CIV.A. 5:09323-KKC, 2013 WL 2285163, at *7 (E.D. Ky. May 22, 2013).
270. See, e.g., In re Motor Fuel, 292 F.R.D. at 676 (certifying the liability aspects of plaintiffs’
claims only); Miri v. Dillon, 292 F.R.D. 454, 456 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (same).
271. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4).
272. See Jacob v. Duane Reade, Inc., 293 F.R.D. 578, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (collecting authority). The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari of two cases involving certification under Rule
23(c)(4). Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct.
1277 (2014); In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838 (6th
Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Whirlpool Corp. v. Glazer, 134. S. Ct. 1277 (2014). Thus, the
availability of Rule 23(c)(4) remains open for application by lower courts.
273. In re Rodriguez, 695 F.3d 360, 369 n.13 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Rule 23(c)(4) explicitly recognizes the flexibility that courts need in class certification by allowing certification with respect to
particular issues and division of the class into subclasses.” (quoting Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 231 F.3d 970, 976 (5th Cir. 2000))).
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Recent court decisions have changed the landscape of certification, but
have not eliminated the need for relief from widespread lender noncompliance in consumer bankruptcy cases. Class actions can compensate affected
debtors and serve as a valuable regulatory check on lender behavior. Moreover, debtor class action claims appear well-suited to survive under modern
certification standards. 274 In light of the regulatory benefits of class litigation, as well as the role of bankruptcy courts in furthering consumer financial protection, debtors’ attorneys should embrace class-wide litigation in
bankruptcy. Courts should likewise apply the certification standards as liberally as precedent permits.
V. CONCLUSION
Addressing lender overreaching in consumer bankruptcy cases is no
easy task. Despite the existence of clear legal and procedural rules, as well
as the oversight of the bankruptcy judge, case trustee, and a variety of bankruptcy professionals, large lenders persist in violating the bankruptcy law
and debtors’ rights in consumer bankruptcy cases. Debtor class actions, if
used expansively, might provide a threat sufficient to alter lenders’ decision
making, encouraging greater levels of compliance than currently exists.
Looking forward, as class action precedent increasingly bars consumers
from asserting small value claims outside of the bankruptcy arena, bankruptcy could conceivably rise in prominence as a potential outlet for these
consumer harms to be addressed. 275
Bankruptcy class actions are an attractive solution to the problems
identified in this Article principally because they require no new institutional resources or law reform measures to be effective. As such, bankruptcy attorneys, case trustees, and courts can embrace the debtor class action to
encourage greater levels of compliance with bankruptcy and related consumer protection law than currently exists. Nevertheless, the debtor class
action should not be pursued to the exclusion of other solutions. In particular, the work of the United States Trustee Program, individual bankruptcy
judges, and case trustees has been essential to bringing past lender and servicer misconduct to light. This work should continue. In addition, scholars
and lawmakers should explore new law reform measures, including addressing the prudence of modern barriers to class actions and advancing
non-class forms of private litigation, to further close consumer bankruptcy’s
enforcement gap.

274. See Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 511, 532 (2013) (“[S]everal indicia suggest that class actions are alive,
well, and thriving as usual, if, in some quarters, in somewhat modified forms.”).
275. This will be discussed in a forthcoming piece. See Bruce, supra note 27.

